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ABSTRACT 
 
This	report	is	an	analysis	of	the	findings	and	insights	drawn	from	six	national	reports,	as	well	as	a	European	Union	(EU)	
and	 global	 report	 developed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 ESPREssO	 project	 (‘Enhancing	 Synergies	 for	 Disaster	 Prevention	 in	 the	
European	Union’).	The	analysis	serves	to	highlight	common	themes	and	issues	across	EU	countries,	with	relevant	insights	
from	the	EU	and	global	levels,	concerning	three	central	challenges	for	successful	disaster	management	in	the	EU:	(1)	
the	 integration	 between	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 (CCA)	 and	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 (DRR);	 (2)	 bridging	 the	 gap	
between	science	and	policy;	and	 (3)	strengthening	 transboundary	crisis	management	 in	 the	EU.	The	purpose	of	 the	
report	is	to	provide	input	and	insights	into	the	final	deliverables	in	the	ESPREssO	project.		
Chapter	3	explores	the	obstacles	and	ways	forward	for	the	integration	between	climate	change	adaptation	(CCA)	and	
disaster	risk	reduction	(DRR)	in	legislation,	policies	and	institutional	arrangements.	The	following	issues	were	identified:	
weak	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 coordination	 in	 CCA	 and	DRR	 governance;	 lack	 of	 capacities	 of	 local	 governments	 for	
implementation	of	CCA	and	DRR	strategies;	resource	limitations	and	poor	implementation	of	strategies;	lack	of	funding;	
political	 awareness	 and	 risk	 perception;	 inadequate	 platforms	 for	 stakeholder	 communication	 and	 engagement;	
unequal	attention	paid	to	CCA	and	DRR;	and,	conflicting	priorities	between	disaster	response	and	risk	reduction.	
Chapter	4	addresses	the	problems	and	potentials	for	bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	policy	for	DRR	and	CCA,	in	
order	 to	 strengthen	 policy-making,	 the	 quality	 and	 availability	 of	 risk	 assessments,	 as	 well	 as	 public	 awareness	 of	
hazards,	risks	and	vulnerabilities.	The	following	issues	were	identified:	inadequate	platforms	and	structures	for	bringing	
science	 closer	 to	policy,	 and	 the	need	 to	build	platforms;	 demand	 for	 risk	 expertise	 in	 public	 institutions;	 a	 lack	of	
available	risk	data	on	vulnerability;	limited	scope	and	outlook	of	research;	low	public	awareness	of	disaster	risks	and	
climate	change	impacts;	complex	scientific	terminology;	and,	new	media	landscapes.		
Finally,	Chapter	5	concerns	the	barriers	and	opportunities	for	strengthening	transboundary	crisis	management	in	the	
EU,	 looking	 at	 existing	 agreements	 and	 arrangements	 between	 individual	 countries	 regionally,	 and	 at	 the	 EU	 level	
generally.	The	following	issues	were	identified:	isolated	national	thinking	and	lack	of	political	will;	absence	of	policies	
and	 tools	 for	 transboundary	 crisis	 management;	 lack	 of	 standardized	 forms	 of	 communication;	 international	
cooperation	 across	 national	 government	 levels;	 a	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 CCA	 as	 a	 cross-border	 issue;	 and,	 conflicting	
priorities	in	environmental	resources	and	DRR.		
Keywords:	 disaster	 risk	 reduction,	 climate	 change	 adaptation,	 integration,	 science	 and	 policy,	 transboundary	
management	
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Executive	summary	
This	report	is	an	analysis	of	the	findings	and	insights	drawn	from	six	national	reports,	as	well	as	a	European	Union	
(EU)	and	global	report	developed	as	part	of	the	ESPREssO	project	(‘Enhancing	Synergies	for	Disaster	Prevention	in	
the	European	Union’).	The	analysis	serves	to	highlight	common	themes	and	issues	across	EU	countries,	with	relevant	
insights	from	the	EU	and	global	levels,	concerning	three	central	challenges	for	successful	disaster	management	in	
the	EU:	(1)	the	integration	between	climate	change	adaptation	(CCA)	and	disaster	risk	reduction	(DRR);	(2)	bridging	
the	gap	between	science	and	policy;	and	(3)	strengthening	transboundary	crisis	management	in	the	EU.	The	purpose	
of	the	report	is	to	provide	input	and	insights	into	the	final	deliverables	in	the	ESPREssO	project.	This	summary	briefly	
outlines	the	identified	issues	for	each	challenge	(click	on	bold	and	underlined	text	to	go	to	the	relevant	section	in	
the	report).	
Chapter	3	explores	the	obstacles	and	ways	forward	for	the	integration	between	climate	change	adaptation	(CCA)	
and	disaster	risk	reduction	(DRR)	in	legislation,	policies	and	institutional	arrangements.	The	following	issues	were	
identified:	
§ Horizontal	and	vertical	coordination	issues	in	CCA	and	DRR	governance	persist.	Often,	the	two	policy	fields	
are	managed	 by	 different	ministries	with	 little	 cooperation,	 and	 there	 is	 furthermore	 a	 lack	 of	 vertical	
cooperation	between	municipalities	and	national	or	federal	governments.	
§ In	addition,	there	is	an	identified	lack	of	capacities	of	local	governments	for	implementation	of	CCA	and	
DRR	strategies,	whereby	municipalities	and	towns	lack	the	necessary	competencies	and	types	of	expertise	
needed	to	be	proactive	and	reshape	policies	to	the	local	context.	
§ These	issues	are	of	course	tied	to,	and	in	turn	catalyse,	resource	limitations	and	poor	implementation	of	
strategies.	Accordingly,	 low	 level	of	 resources	and	capacities	with	 local	public	officials	 is	 a	 considerable	
hindrance	to	the	efforts	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR.	
§ Lack	of	funding	is	a	general	issue	in	most	policy	areas.	However,	the	issue	is	not	merely	tied	to	a	lack	of	
funds	as	such,	but	to	the	structures	that	direct	funding	flows,	exemplified	by	more	funds,	in	some	countries,	
being	allocated	for	CCA	than	for	integrative	approaches	between	CCA	and	DRR.	
§ This	 might	 in	 turn	 be	 related	 to	 different	 levels	 and	 forms	 of	 political	 awareness	 and	 risk	 perception	
amongst	policy	and	decision	makers,	especially	a	lack	of	awareness	of	the	benefits	brought	on	by	further	
integration	between	DRR	and	CCA.	
§ Raising	 awareness	 across	 institutions	 and	 sectors	 is	 hindered	 by	 inadequate	 platforms	 for	 stakeholder	
communication	and	engagement.	 In	part,	 this	 is	due	 to	 the	gap	between	DRR	and	CCA	scientific	expert	
communities	and	cultures	using	different	terminologies.	
§ A	related	point	is	that	unequal	attention	are	paid	to	CCA	and	DRR.	As	climate	change	has	become	such	an	
important	policy	area	 in	 recent	years,	 combined	with	 the	 fact	 that	CCA	has	been	 integrated	with	other	
policy	domains	such	as	urban	planning,	the	added	value	of	“green	adaptation”	has	become	an	attractive	
idea	for	politicians	to	support	and	promote.	
§ Finally,	there	are	conflicting	priorities	between	disaster	response	and	risk	reduction.	Thus,	a	recurring	issue	
in	disaster	management	across	the	world	is	that	more	funding	and	political	attention	is	given	to	response	
and	preparedness	activities	and	mechanisms	which	sustains	short-term,	rather	than	long-term,	thinking.		
Chapter	4	address	the	problems	and	potentials	for	bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	policy	for	DRR	and	CCA,	
in	order	to	strengthen	policy-making,	the	quality	and	availability	of	risk	assessments,	as	well	as	public	awareness	of	
hazards,	risks	and	vulnerabilities.	The	following	issues	were	identified:	
§ As	 is	 the	case	for	the	 integration	of	CCA	and	DDR,	a	general	 issue	for	this	challenge	are	the	 inadequate	
platforms	and	structures	 for	bringing	 science	closer	 to	policy.	Thus,	we	need	 to	build	platforms	able	 to	
support	the	translation	of	knowledge	into	policy	and	application,	ideally	through	skilled	experts	in	public	
institutions	working	as	mediators	of	science.	
§ Directly	 related	 to	 this,	 there	 is	 an	 identified	demand	 for	 risk	expertise	 in	public	 institutions	which	 can	
facilitate,	and	critically	use,	risk	assessments	and	appropriate	new	knowledge	from	scientific	 institutions	
and	academia.	Expertise	 from	private	consultancies	and	NGOs	might	be	a	useful	 resource	 for	 filling	 the	
gaps,	but	here	it	was	reported	that	locating	the	right	kinds	of	skills	among	employees	is	often	equally	hard.	
§ Although	European	states	have	generally	come	a	long	way	in	terms	of	making	risk	tools,	there	is	still	an	
identifiable	lack	of	available	risk	data	on	vulnerability.	That	is,	data	that	does	not	focus	solely	on	the	physical	
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aspects	of	hazards,	but	also	concerns	the	consolidation	of,	and	access	to,	data	across	sectors,	actors	and	
institutions.	
§ Although	more	research	than	ever	before	is	conducted	on	disasters	and	risks,	three	points	are	highlighted	
to	illustrate	where	there	is	still	a	limited	scope	and	outlook	of	research:	1)		focus	on	single	hazard	rather	
than	multi-hazard	approaches;	2)	stronger	scientific	focus	on	CCA	than	DRR;	and	3)	underrepresentation	of	
the	social	sciences.	
§ Traditionally,	one	of	the	hardest	 issues	to	deal	with	concerns	 low	public	awareness	of	disaster	risks	and	
climate	change	impacts	which	hinders	effective	implementation	of	many	strategies,	plans	and	policies	at	
the	local	and	municipal	levels.	Lack	of	awareness,	even	in	highly	hazard	prone	areas,	still	exist	in	all	surveyed	
countries	despite	increasing	efforts	by	governments	to	invest	more	in	risk	communication.	A	related	issue	
concerns	the	marginal	presence	of	risk	and	vulnerability	in	educational	institutions.	
§ A	 frequently	 reported	 issue	 is	 that	 complex	 scientific	 terminology	 hinders	 effective	 translation	 of	
knowledge	 from	 science	 to	 policy,	 as	well	 as	 from	 researchers	 to	 the	 public.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 question	 of	
“dumbing	down”	science,	but	rather	to	find	other	ways	of	communicating	and	explaining	complex	issues	in	
comprehensible	ways.	 	
§ Finally,	new	media	landscapes	challenge	public	agencies’	emergency	communication	and	the	public’s	trust	
in	online	communication,	not	least	on	social	media.	This	is	coupled	with	a	general	lack	of	engagement	with	
social	media	by	authorities,	who	often	have	unclear	or	no	strategies	for	reaching	out	to	the	public	via	these	
platforms.	
Finally,	Chapter	5	concerns	the	barriers	and	opportunities	for	strengthening	transboundary	crisis	management	in	
the	EU,	 looking	at	existing	agreements	and	arrangements	between	individual	countries	regionally,	and	at	the	EU	
level	generally.	The	following	issues	were	identified:	
§ A	 fundamental	 issue	 is	 a	widespread	 sense	of	 isolated	national	 thinking	 and	 lack	of	 political	will	which	
hinders	the	promotion	and	development	transboundary	policies,	tools	and	practices.	Thus,	there	is	a	need	
to	 challenge	 the	 perception	 that	 emergencies	 can	 be	 adequately	 dealt	 with	 without	 the	 need	 for	
international	assistance.	
§ Although	there	are	a	multitude	of	bilateral	and	multilateral	signed	agreements	between	EU	member	states	
for	dealing	with	risks,	there	is	an	absence	of	policies	and	tools	for	transboundary	crisis	management	and	a	
lack	of	legal	instruments	and	concrete	policies	that	can	be	used	by	national,	regional	and	local	governments	
in	transboundary	crisis	response.		
§ An	 identified	 issue	 in	 several	 countries	 is	 the	 lack	of	 standardized	 forms	of	 communication,	which	 also	
relates	to	knowledge	sharing	for	DRR	and	CCA,	beyond	emergency	and	crisis	communication.	The	language	
barrier	is	mentioned	as	a	central	aspect	of	this	issue.	
§ A	further	 issue	relates	 to	 international	cooperation	across	national	government	 levels.	The	 lack	of	clear	
policies	and	tools	for	intra-national	emergency	management	affect	international	cooperation,	in	particular	
when	sub-national	or	sub-federal	government	entities	have	to	engage	in	international	cooperation.		
§ On	top	of	the	other	issues	related	to	DRR	and	CCA	integration,	a	lack	of	attention	to	CCA	as	a	cross-border	
issue	also	exists,	 in	particular	with	regard	to	interpretation	and	implementation	of	policies.	This	adds	an	
additional	 level	 of	 complexity	 to	 international	 transboundary	 crisis	 management,	 which	 is	 further	
exacerbated	if	a	country	has	many	neighbours,	such	as	Switzerland,	Germany	or	France.		
§ Finally,	conflicting	priorities	 in	environmental	resources	and	DRR	also	affect	transboundary	cooperation,	
for	 instance	 in	 the	ways	 in	which	environmental	protection	hinders	effective	 flood	 control	 in	upstream	
rivers	 and	 along	 coasts.	 This	 issue	 pertains	 both	 to	 the	 need	 for	 bilateral	 or	 multi-lateral	 cooperation	
between	individual	countries,	as	well	as	to	the	role	of	EU	policies	in	individual	countries,	for	instance	EU	
habitat	zones	imposing	restrictions	on	water	course	management.	
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1 Introduction	
In	the	last	decade,	Europe	has	experienced	a	significant	rise	in	disaster	losses	(EU	2014).	Accordingly,	the	European	
Union	(EU)	has	developed	a	number	of	disaster	related	mechanisms	aimed	at	improving	European	disaster	
response(s),	and	reducing	disaster	impacts	and	risks.	However,	disaster	risks	persist.	Natural	hazards,	such	as	the	
2013	European	floods,	can	result	in	significant	loss	of	lives	and	major	economic	impacts.	Globally,	an	estimated	
199.2	million	people	are	impacted	by	natural	disasters	each	year	on	average	(Guha-Sapir	et	al.,	2015),	and	in	2011	
alone	the	estimated	economic	value	of	assets	damaged	due	to	natural	hazards	amounted	to	371	billion	(USD)	(EM	
DAT,	2016).		
	
Climate	change	adds	additional	concern,	with	the	frequency	and	magnitude	of	hydro-meteorological	disasters	
projected	to	increase	over	the	coming	decades	(IPCC,	2013).	Along	with	climate	change-induced	extreme	weather,	
increasing	urbanization	and	society’s	ever-increasing	dependence	on	technology	and	infrastructure	means	Europe	
is	more	vulnerable	to	natural	hazards	than	ever.	Changes	in	physical,	technological	and	social	systems	coupled	
with	recent	high-profile	mega-disasters,	such	as	the	2017	Atlantic	hurricane	Irma,	are	raising	global	awareness	of	
the	need	to	build	the	capacity	of	national	governments,	civil	society	organizations	and	international	actors	to	
prevent,	respond	to	and	recover	from	natural	disasters	(Ferris	and	Petz,	2013).		
		
In	this	context,	the	ESPREssO	project	aims	to	address	three	challenges	within	the	context	of	disaster	management:	
the	integration	of	climate	change	adaptation	and	disaster	risk	reduction	efforts;	bridging	the	gap	between	science	
and	policy;	and	strengthening	trans-boundary	crisis	management	within	the	EU.		
		
The	purpose	of	this	report	is	to	identify	challenges,	recommendations	and	examples	of	best	practice	in	context	of	
the	three	ESPREssO	challenges.	The	findings	of	this	report	will	contribute	to	the	production	of	recommendations	
for	risk	management	capability	and	future	research	agendas	for	the	European	Union	in	forthcoming	ESPREssO	
outputs.	This	report	provides	a	comprehensive	review	of	the	ESPREssO	challenges	within	six	EU	member	states	
across	the	EU	and	also	draws	on	examples	from	other	parts	of	the	world.	In	particular,	the	report	draws	out	issues	
that	were	found	to	span	multiple	EU	member	states	and	those	that	have	been	identified	internationally.	A	detailed	
methodology	is	presented	in	Section	2.	Section	3	identifies	the	borders	between	CCA	and	DRR	practices.	Section	4	
considers	the	gap	between	science	and	policy.	Section	5	addresses	the	strengthening	of	transboundary	crisis	
management	in	the	EU	and	Section	6	summarises	the	issues	that	cut	across	the	three	challenges,	while	discussing	
some	possible	solutions	and	ways	ahead.	
	
	
The	ESPREssO	project:	
This	 report	 is	 deliverable	 2.2	 of	 the	 EU	 H2020-project	 “Enhancing	 synergies	 for	 disaster	 prevention	 in	 the	
European	Union”	(ESPREssO).	ESPREssO	aims	to	contribute	to	a	new	strategic	vision	for	disaster	risk	reduction	
and	climate	change	adaptation,	thereby	opening	new	frontiers	for	 research	and	policy	making.	The	project	 is	
coordinated	 by	 the	 Italian	 research	 center	 AMRA	 (Analysis	 and	Monitoring	 of	 Environmental	 Risk),	 with	 the	
participation	of	partners	from	six	European	states;	France,	Italy,	Germany,	Switzerland,	the	UK,	and	Denmark.		
The	final	products	of	ESPREssO	are	a	set	of	Guidelines,	which	will	 identify	best	practices	on	 risk	management	
capability,	and	a	Vision	Paper	on	future	research	strategies	for	the	EU,	in	line	with	the	research	priorities	following	
the	Sendai	Framework	for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	(SFDRR)	2015–2030.		
Further	information	can	be	found	online	at	www.espressoproject.eu.	
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2 Methodology			
This	report	draws	upon	the	key	findings	and	extractions	from	a	global	review,	an	EU	review	and	six	national	reports	
developed	for	Italy,	Germany,	France,	Switzerland,	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	and	Denmark.	Table	1	provides	details	
of	the	institutions	that	led	the	development	of	the	separate	input	papers.		 	
Table	1:	Lead	contributors	to	the	input	reports.	
Input	Papers	 Lead	Contributors	
Italy		 AMRA	-	ANALISI	E	MONITORAGGIO	DEL	RISCHIO	AMBIENTALE	SCARL	
Germany		
	
DEUTSCHES	KOMITEE	KATASTROPHENVORSORGE	E.V.	
HELMHOLTZ	ZENTRUM	POTSDAM	DEUTSCHES	
GEOFORSCHUNGSZENTRUM	
France	 BUREAU	DE	RECHERCHES	GEOLOGIQUES	ET	MINIERES	
Switzerland	 EIDGENOESSISCHE	TECHNISCHE	HOCHSCHULE	ZUERICH	
United	Kingdom		 THE	UNIVERSITY	OF	HUDDERSFIELD		
Denmark		 KOBENHAVNS	UNIVERSITET	
EU	review	 KOBENHAVNS	UNIVERSITET	
Global	Review	 THE	UNIVERSITY	OF	HUDDERSFIELD	
	
Although	 each	 national	 report	was	 developed	 and	written	 by	 individual	 partners	 (Table	 1),	 data	 collection	 and	
analysis	was	coordinated	to	ensure	consistency.	Consistency	was	achieved	through	regular	review	meetings	and	the	
use	of	standard	protocols	and	templates.	The	national	reports	are	based	on	samples	of	data	collected	by	respective	
ESPREssO	project	partners.	Semi-structured	interviews	were	the	key	data	collection	tool	with	additional	focus	group	
interviews	and	a	questionnaire	survey	employed	for	the	global	review	report.	A	detailed	presentation	of	the	data	
collection	and	analysis	carried	out	for	each	country	can	be	found	in	the	respective	national	reports.		
In	 addition,	 a	 further	 data	 collection	 exercise	 was	 conducted	 with	 experts	 that	 have	 insight	 into	 the	 global	
perspective	on	DRR	and	CCA,	 in	order	to	further	support	the	extracted	findings	from	the	national,	EU	and	global	
reports.	 Semi-structured	 interviews	 and	 focus	 groups	were	 conducted	with	 27	 global	 experts	 in	 the	 field.	 They	
represented	 a	 range	 of	 government	 institutions,	 international	 organizations,	 NGOs,	 local	 governing	 bodies	 and	
academic	institutions.	The	collected	data	were	thematically	analysed	using	NVIVO	11	qualitative	analysis	software	
(QSR	International	Ltd.,	2017).	A	detailed	description	of	the	data	collection	and	analysis	is	described	in	Appendix	01.	
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3 Challenge	one:	Integration	between	climate	change	
adaptation	and	disaster	risk	reduction		
There	 is	 growing	 recognition	 that	 the	 theory	 and	 practice	 of	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 (CCA)	 and	 disaster	 risk	
reduction	(DRR)	are	converging	(Solecki	et	al.,	2011).	A	number	of	researchers,	policy	makers	and	practitioners	have	
identified	synergies	between	CCA	and	DRR	(Sperling	and	Szekely,	2005,	Thomalla	et	al.,	2006,	Venton	and	Trobe,	
2008,	Mercer,	2010,	Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010,	Gero	et	al.,	2010).	Both	CCA	and	DRR	have	a	mutual	aim,	to	
reduce	vulnerability	and	in	finding	ways	of	working	together	both	activities	will	benefit.	For	example,	DRR	measures	
will	 lessen	 the	 impact	 of	 extreme	 events	 that	 are	 becoming	 more	 frequent	 due	 to	 climate	 impact,	 while	 CCA	
measures	lessen	disaster	risk	(Lei	and	Wang,	2014,	Venton	and	Trobe,	2008,	Mitchell	and	van	Aalst,	2008).	However,	
the	two	domains	have	developed	in	parallel,	and	despite	clear	overlaps,	remain	independent.	To	date,	there	has	
been	much	discussion	surrounding	the	topic	of	integration,	but	very	little	research	exists	on	how	this	can	be	achieved	
(Hay,	 2012,	Gero	 et	 al.,	 2010).	While	 there	may	be	 institutional	 arrangements	 that	 suggest	 some	progress	with	
integration	at	the	national	policy	and	institutional	levels,	the	practical	reality	is	that	little	is	happening	on	the	ground	
at	the	operational	level.	
This	section	discusses	key	barriers	that	are	preventing	successful	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	and	presents	examples	
of	best	practices	and	potential	ways	forward.	Key	challenges	include,	horizontal	and	vertical	coordination	in	CCA	and	
DRR	governance	structures,	weak	capacity	for	implementation	at	local	levels,	lack	of	funding,	lack	of	awareness	and	
risk	perception,	stakeholder	communication	and	engagement,	unequal	attention	for	CCA	and	DRR	and	competing	
priorities.	
3.1 Horizontal	and	vertical	coordination	issues	in	CCA	and	DRR	governance	
Divergent	government	structures	are	widely	acknowledged	as	one	of	the	major	challenges	in	integrating	CCA	and	
DRR	(Shaw	et	al.,	2010).	In	many	countries,	CCA	and	DRR	are	managed	by	different	government	entities	that	operate	
separately.	For	example,	CCA	and	DRR	were	found	to	be	managed	by	different	government	ministries	in	Denmark,	
Germany,	Italy,	Switzerland	and	the	UK	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017,	Booth	et	al.,	2017,	Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a,	Zuccaro	et	
al.,	2017,	Marx	et	al.,	2017).	In	France,	although	CCA	and	DRR	are	managed	by	the	same	ministry,	they	fall	under	
two	 independent	directorates	 (Ettinger	et	 al.,	 2017).	 This	 is	 an	 issue	 that	 is	not	 limited	 to	Europe.	 Studies	have	
identified	that	CCA	and	DRR	in	Australia,	Ethiopia,	Jordan	(UNDP	and	IUCN,	2012),	Nicaragua	(Rivera,	2014),	Pacific	
Island	Territories	(Coppola,	2015)	and	the	USA	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b)	are	managed	and	governed	by	separate	
ministries.	 However,	 several	 Asian	 countries	 have	 demonstrated	 best	 practice	 in	 combining	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 into	
singular	government	entities.	The	Philippines	have	shown	the	highest	level	of	political	confidence	by	bringing	two	
legislative	 orders	 for	 both	 domains	 together.	 In	 Sri	 Lanka,	 the	 Department	 of	 Meteorology	 and	 the	 Disaster	
Management	Centre	are	also	governed	by	a	single	ministry	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
The	development	and	implementation	of	two	sets	of	policies	by	two	separate	institutions	creates	several	issues.	For	
example,	 parallel	 development	 can	 result	 in	 policies	 that	 contradict	 one	 another.	 In	 Italy,	 concurring	 legislation	
(states/regions)	of	Civil	Protection	generated	a	variety	of	regional	 laws	that	are	 in	conflict	 (Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	
Furthermore,	 separate	 institutions	 working	 on	 similar	 topics	 can	 generate	 inter-agency	 rivalries.	 In	 Germany	
competition	between	agencies	has	been	noted,	where	agencies	 vie	 to	 retain	as	much	 responsibility	as	possible,	
ultimately	resulting	in	an	unclear	distribution	of	responsibilities	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).		
Various	 recommendations	 have	 been	 suggested	 as	ways	 forward	 for	 bringing	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 government	 actors	
together.	Analysis	of	the	global	data	which	were	collected	as	a	part	of	the	ESPREssO	project,	suggests	that	for	many	
countries,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 a	 ‘complete	 institutional	 overhaul’	 and	 restructuring	 to	 bring	 about	 political	
cooperation	(see	Appendix	01).	Alternative	ways	forward	include	embedding	CCA	within	DRR	(Kelman	et	al.,	2017),	
or	DRR	within	CCA.	It	is	suggested	for	the	German	context	that	CCA	and	DRR	should	not	be	mechanically	integrated	
at	the	federal	level,	but	should	be	jointly	integrated	into	other	policy	areas	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	Adding	to	this,	the	
German	Adaptation	Strategy	to	Climate	Change	provides	an	example	of	the	successful	application	of	DRR	as	a	cross-
cutting	issue	within	CCA.	The	Strategy	was	found	to	have	been	successful	in	initiating	cooperation	and	collaborative	
initiatives	in	Germany.	This	German	example	can	be	identified	as	a	potential	way	forward	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR.			
Although	 there	 is	 no	 definite	 notion	 on	 how	 to	 bring	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 government	 departments	 together	 at	 the	
national/federal	level,	there	is	a	clear	need	for	greater	communication	and	coordination,	which	may	help	to	alleviate	
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issues	 such	 as	 overlapping	 or	 contradicting	 policies.	 There	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 greater	 understanding	 between	
departments	of	 their	 remit,	clarification	of	where	they	overlap	and	understanding	 that	 they	are	both	aiming	 for	
common	goals,	as	highlighted	by	the	Swiss	national	report	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).		
At	the	EU	level	however,	there	are	strategies	and	agreements	that	emphasise	the	need	to	have	synergies	between	
CCA	and	DRR,	such	as	the	Paris	Agreement	(COP21)	and	the	EU	Floods	Directive.	The	EU	Cohesion	Policy	for	example,	
has	as	one	of	its	eleven	priorities	to	“promote	climate	change	adaptation,	risk	prevention	and	management”.	The	
Cohesion	policy	is	the	policy	behind	projects	in	Member	States	funded	by	the	European	Regional	Development	Fund	
(ERDF),	the	European	Social	Fund	and	the	Cohesion	Fund	(European	Commission,	2017b).		
Looking	beyond	the	EU,	Forino	et	al.	(2015)	present	a	conceptual	governance	framework	for	CCA	and	DRR	integration	
in	Australia.	The	study	identifies	three	key	domains	of	CCA/DRR	actors,	the	state	domain,	the	market	domain	and	
the	 social	 domain.	 Three	 arrangements	 are	 identified	 to	 provide	 bridges	 between	 the	 three	 groups.	 	 The	 three	
bridging	 arrangements	 are	 public-private	 partnerships	 (between	 the	 state	 and	 market	 actors),	 private-social	
partnerships	(between	the	market	and	social	domains)	and	co-management,	to	bridge	the	state	and	social	domains.	
Coordination	issues	are	not	only	present	between	national	level	government	departments,	but	also	between	levels	
of	government	(national,	regional,	local	and	municipal).		
Local	 governments	 or	municipalities	 are	 often	 responsible	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	DRR	 and/or	 CCA	 activities	
based	on	decisions	made	at	the	national	level.	This	is	the	case	for	Demark,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	Switzerland	and	
the	UK	 (Lauta	et	al.,	2017,	Booth	et	al.,	2017,	Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a,	Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017,	Marx	et	al.,	2017,	
Ettinger	et	al.,	2017)	and	globally	in	Canada	and	Australia	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b),	to	name	only	a	few	examples.	
The	disconnect	between	the	central	or	federal	government	and	local	levels,	can	often	result	in	decisions	that	may	
not	necessarily	reflect	local	needs.	For	example,	in	Switzerland	laws	are	made	at	the	federal	level	and	actions	are	
implemented	at	the	Canton*	level.	In	a	study	of	the	Swiss	context,	information	transfer	from	the	Federal	Government	
to	municipalities	was	found	to	occur	readily,	however,	a	similar	flow	of	information	from	municipalities	up	to	Canton	
and	Federal	levels	was	not	evident	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	As	a	result,	decisions	made	at	the	federal	level	lack	proper	
consideration	 for	 the	needs	 and	 capabilities	 of	 the	Cantons	 and	municipalities.	 A	 similar	 situation	was	 found	 in	
France,	where	federal	decisions	are	not	always	applicable	to	the	local	level	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	
Due	to	fragmentation	of	local	jurisdictions,	there	can	be	limited	horizontal	coordination	and	a	lack	of	awareness	of	
the	actions	of	parallel	authorities.	Fragmented	local	governance	has	been	observed	in	the	UK	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	
2017a)	and	local	jurisdictions	frequently	operate	in	parallel,	as	seen	in	the	Länder†	of	Germany	(Marx	et	al.,	2017)	
and	between	Cantons	in	Switzerland	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	Minimal	communication	between	municipalities	in	Italy	
has	resulted	in	a	limited	awareness	of	the	actions	of	others	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	
Global	 frameworks	 advocate	 the	 need	 for	 coordination	 between	 government	 levels.	 The	 SFDRR	 champions	 the	
state’s	 role	 in	 reducing	 disaster	 risk	 and	 the	 sharing	 of	 responsibilities	 with	 other	 stakeholders	 (including	 local	
governments	and	the	private	sector)	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	One	of	the	main	features	of	the	Paris	Agreement	
is	its	‘bottom-up’	structure,	focusing	on	adaptation	measures	that	are	country-driven	and	based	upon	indigenous	
and	local	knowledge	(UNFCCC,	2016).	None-the-less,	it	remains	clear	that	implementation	based	on	local	knowledge	
cannot	 take	place	without	coordination	between	government	 levels	and	effective	 two-way	 (bottom-up	and	 top-
down)	communication.		
To	ensure	policies	are	suitable	for	localities	in	Switzerland,	an	increase	in	bottom-up	communication	from	the	local	
level	to	the	federal	 level	and	greater	participation	of	 local	stakeholders	 in	the	decision-making	process	has	been	
recommended.	 In	 addition,	 a	 central	 information	 platform	 for	 the	 sharing	 of	 best	 practices	 between	 local	
jurisdictions	would	increase	knowledge	sharing	and	allow	for	a	more	cohesive	approach	to	the	integration	of	CCA	
and	DRR	across	localities	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	There	is	also	a	need	for	different	levels	to	be	aware	of	their	role	and	
what	they	are	responsible	for.	An	overall	minimization	of	the	national-local	disconnect	will	allow	for	the	goals	of	
international	frameworks	to	be	achieved	through	implementation	at	the	local	level.		
																																																																		
*	Cantons	are	the	member	states	of	the	Swiss	Confederation,	of	which	there	are	26.		
†	Länder	are	the	states	of	the	federal	republic	of	Germany,	of	which	there	are	16.		
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3.2 Lack	of	capacities	of	local	governments	for	implementation	of	CCA	and	DRR	
strategies	
Although	 local	 jurisdictions	 have	 the	 responsibility	 for	 CCA	 and	 DRR,	 they	 do	 not	 always	 have	 the	 resources,	
knowledge	or	ability	to	manage	all	principles,	policies	and	practices	bestowed	upon	them,	let	alone	integrate	CCA	
and	DRR	actions	(Nemakonde	et	al.,	2017).	This	issue	was	frequently	highlighted	in	the	analysis	of	the	six	national	
reports	 (Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a,	Booth	et	al.,	2017,	Ettinger	et	al.,	2017,	Lauta	et	al.,	2017,	Marx	et	al.,	2017,	
Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	 In	 Italy,	 regional	governments	have	 resources	available,	but	 their	 role	 is	predominantly	 to	
provide	guidelines,	while	the	municipalities,	who	are	responsible	for	implementation,	lack	the	required	resources	
(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	Limited	capacity	of	local	governments	(including	financial	limitations)	was	noted	as	a	barrier	
to	CCA	and	DRR	integration	in	the	UK	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a),	Germany	(Marx	et	al.,	2017),	Denmark	(Lauta	et	
al.,	2017)	and	France	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	Local	authorities	in	the	UK	were	found	to	not	prioritize	CCA	and	DRR	as	
they	have	other	more	immediate	matters	that	take	precedence,	for	example,	economic	growth	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	
2017a).	Globally,	a	lack	of	local	capacity	was	found	in	Australia,	Canada	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b)	and	South	Africa	
(Ziervogel	et	al.,	2014),	where	local	governments	simply	do	not	have	the	required	resources	for	implementation	(this	
matter	is	discussed	further	in	Section	3.3).	
It	is	noted	in	UNISDR	(2017)	that	European	countries	generally	have	a	good	technical	capacity	for	DRR.	However,	
they	recommend	that	city-to-city	exchanges	would	increase	technical	capacity	in	regions	where	it	is	currently	lacking.	
This	would	also	contribute	to	providing	further	horizontal	links	between	localities	(as	also	addressed	in	section	3.2).	
Education	programmes	are	one	suggested	method	of	 increasing	 local	 capacity	 (UNISDR,	2017).	 Investment	 from	
federal	governments	in	capacity	and	awareness	building	at	the	local	level	would	help	with	the	harmonisation	of	CCA	
and	DRR,	as	suggested	for	the	German	context	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	The	clear	identification	of	overlaps	between	CCA	
and	DRR	will	allow	resources	to	be	allocated	efficiently	and	reduce	duplication	of	work,	thus	reducing	strain	on	local	
resources.	Increased	local	capacity	and	local	empowerment	is	key	to	promoting	DRR,	and	is	thus	essential	for	the	
implementation	of	the	SFDRR	(UNISDR,	2017).	Promoting	local	capacity	 is	also	 in	 line	with	the	UNISDR	campaign	
‘Making	Cities	Resilient:	Essential	6’,	which	is	to	“strengthen	institutional	capacity	for	resilience”	as	part	of	the	overall	
aim	of	raising	the	profile	of	resilience	and	DRR	among	local	governments	worldwide	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
A	 related	 issue	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 engagement	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 programmes	 and	 projects	
(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	One	way	to	relieve	the	strain	on	local	governments	could	be	to	foster	engagement	of	
the	private	sector	 in	CCA	and	DRR.	Private	actors	often	have	the	financial	capacity	to	make	a	mark,	and	in	some	
cases,	have	taken	a	leading	role	in	CCA/DRR.	Although	it	must	be	noted	that	this	may	be	a	result	of	added	business	
incentive	 to	do	so.	 Insurance	companies,	 for	example,	have	vested	 interests	 in	natural	hazards	due	 to	 the	 large	
volume	of	insurance	claims	that	may	result.	In	France	and	Switzerland,	insurance	companies	and	reinsurers	have	
been	identified	as	key	players	in	implementing	CCA	and	DRR	actions	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017,	Booth	et	al.,	2017).	 In	
Switzerland,	the	tourism	industry	(predominantly	the	ski	industry)	is	described	as	an	‘agent	of	change’	as	they	have	
been	the	first	to	feel	the	impacts	of	climate	change,	thus	the	first	to	take	action	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	Encouraging	
private	 actors	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 could	 further	 positive	 action	 while	 relieving	 the	 strain	 on	 local	
government.	
3.3 Resource	Limitations	and	Poor	Implementation	of	Strategies	
Section	3.2	described	the	lack	of	capacities	of	local	governments	to	implement	CCA	and	DRR	strategies.	This	section	
looks	 further	 at	 resource	 limitations	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 integration	 in	 general	 and	 also	 the	 poor	
implementation	of	the	identified	strategies.		
Lack	of	resources	is	one	of	the	most	significant	factors	preventing	implementation	and	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	
actions.	Resource	limitations	are	linked	to	three	main	areas;	human,	technical	and	funding.	This	section	focuses	on	
the	lack	of	capacity	in	human,	technical	and	other	resources	which	together	affect	the	implementation	of	CCA	and	
DRR	strategies.	The	funding	barrier	will	be	discussed	in	Section	3.4.			
Successful	CCA-DRR	integration	needs	to	be	implemented	through	actors	that	have	a	certain	degree	of	expertise	in	
the	field,	coupled	with	proper	governance	structures	(discussed	in	Section	3.1).	Yet,	the	absence	of	such	expertise	
hinders	processes	of	integration.	In	the	UK,	NGOs,	some	private	sectors	and	some	government	entities	lack	disaster	
risk	experts	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	Zuccaro	et	al.	(2017)	highlight	that	there	is	a	lack	of	awareness	of	existing	
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risks	 among	 officials	 in	 relevant	 government	 bodies	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 personnel	 with	 sufficient	 scientific	 and	
technological	background	able	to	understand	the	nature	of	risks,	in	dealing	with	CCA	and	DRR	in	Italy.	Accordingly,	
Amaratunga	 et	 al.	 (2017a)	 and	 Zuccaro	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 state	 that	 this	 issue	 is	 linked	with	 education,	 funding	 and	
resources.	 This	 is	 also	a	 global	 issue.	Based	on	a	 study	 conducted	by	UNISDR	and	UNDP	 (2012),	 the	absence	of	
expertise	 is	one	of	 the	key	barriers	 for	 integration	 in	 the	Pacific,	 together	with	other	 factors	 such	as	 lack	of	 co-
ordination,	communication,	political	will	and	insufficient	funds	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	In	South	Africa,	a	lack	of	
capacity,	high	turnover	of	staff	within	government	departments	and	limited	understanding	of	climate-related	issues	
were	all	identified	as	barriers	(Ziervogel	et	al.,	2014).		
When	expertise	is	available	for	one	subject	area	(CCA	or	DRR),	it	may	be	lacking	in	the	other,	which	presents	a	barrier	
for	integration.	For	instance,	Hinkel	et	al.	(2015)	state	that	the	formats	in	which	knowledge	on	climate	change	is	
supplied	is	not	well	aligned	to	current	DRR	decision	making	in	the	French	context.		
In	 addition	 to	 unequal	 distribution	 of	 expertise	 between	 fields,	 there	 are	 also	 examples	 of	 unequal	 resource	
distribution	between	regional	levels.	The	analysis	confirms	that	although	countries	such	as	Denmark	(Lauta	et	al.,	
2017),	Italy	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017)	and	Germany	(Marx	et	al.,	2017)	have	enough	resources,	they	see	uneven	allocation	
of	resources	among	the	national,	regional	and	local	levels	as	a	major	barrier	to	the	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR.	For	
instance,	Lauta	et	al.	(2017)	state	that	in	Denmark,	there	are	significant	differences	in	the	ability	of	municipalities	to	
take	 action	 in	 terms	of	 CCA,	 depending	on	 their	 size,	 budget	 and	 allocated	 resources.	 Larger	municipalities	 like	
Copenhagen	have,	not	surprisingly,	been	more	active	in	implementing	CCA	plans.	A	barrier	then	exists	in	terms	of	
the	national	government	giving	municipalities	a	flexible	mandate	on	CCA,	which	 is	not	beneficial	 for	most	of	the	
smaller	municipalities	(Jensen	et	al.,	2016).	In	addition,	the	traditional	emergency	management	sector	in	Denmark	
is	under	a	lot	of	pressure	after	being	restructured	into	larger	units,	which	has	prompted	emergency	response	actors	
to	call	for	more	funding	and	resources	to	meet	the	current	increase	in	storm	surge	and	cloud	burst	events.	In	Italy,	
the	laws	controlling	the	division	of	roles	between	the	political	levels	raise	problems,	as	the	regions	have	resources	
available,	but	their	role	is	limited	to	providing	general	guidelines,	while	the	municipalities	and	the	provinces	are	in	
charge	of	producing	emergency	response	plans,	but	do	not	have	adequate	resources	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).		
Adding	to	this,	municipalities	in	Germany	also	have	difficulties	in	implementing	policies	on	the	ground.	Municipalities	
often	do	not	have	sufficient	resources	to	address	CCA	issues,	and	even	less	for	bringing	together	CCA	and	DRR	in	a	
coherent	manner	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	Many	funding	programmes	ask	for	a	financial	contribution	from	the	applicant	
(“Eigenfinanzierungsanteil”),	often	amounting	to	up	to	25%	of	the	total	costs.	Many	cities	and	communities	are	not	
able	to	provide	the	necessary	amount	of	financial	resources.	For	some	agencies,	writing	a	promising	application	for	
funding	can	be	a	demanding	task	which	requires	well-informed,	experienced	staff	members.	Agencies	who	do	not	
have	 the	 personnel	 resources	 needed	 for	 the	 application	 may	 find	 the	 process	 challenging	 and,	 at	 times,	
disappointing	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	Accordingly,	it	can	be	understood	that	lack	of	expertise,	lack	of	capacity,	lack	of	
resources,	lack	of	information	and	uneven	distribution	of	resources	are	linked	and	act	together	as	a	barrier	for	the	
integration	CCA	and	DRR.	Consequently,	the	following	discussion	highlights	the	examples	of	good	practices	around	
the	globe	addressing	the	above	identified	issues.	
Rivera	(2014)	highlights	that	the	creation	of	coordinated	actions	between	CCA	and	DRR	would	avoid	the	redundancy	
of	efforts	and	ensure	better	use	of	human	and	financial	resources.	If	the	gap	still	needs	to	be	filled,	then	further	
investment	in	capacity	building	should	be	established.	Agreeing	with	this,	with	reference	to	the	German	context,	
Marx	et	al.	(2017)	state	that	institutionalised	and	integrated	structures	dealing	with	DRR	and	CCA,	especially	on	state	
and	municipal	levels,	need	to	be	set	up	through	investment	in	capacity	building	and	awareness	raising	at	the	local	
level.		
Good	practices	around	the	globe	recommend	the	possibilities	of	resource	sharing.	For	instance,	 in	Switzerland,	a	
shared	and	conscious	“whole	of	society”	approach,	spanning	policy	and	society	to	address	CCA	and	DRR,	is	emerging,	
with	 synergies	 between	 the	 two	 developing	 as	 they	 make	 advancements	 via	 shared	 resources	 such	 as	 an	
internationally-connected	 science	 programme,	 shared	 funding	 and	multi-level	 cooperation	 (Booth	 et	 al.,	 2017).	
Similarly,	 in	Germany,	 the	need	 for	 information	sharing	has	been	 identified.	There	 is	a	strong	need	 for	constant	
discussion	and	reconciliation	with	the	administrations	under	the	responsibilities	of	other	government	departments	
as,	for	instance,	questions	concerning	flood	protection	or	risk	management	in	the	context	of	hazardous	facilities,	are	
shared	with	the	departments	of	environment	and/or	economy	at	all	administrative	levels.	Sharing	of	information	
acts	to	prevent	duplication	of	work	and	contributes	to	effective	use	of	resources.		
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Relating	 this	 to	 the	 international	 perspective,	 the	 2009	 White	 Paper	 ‘Adapting	 to	 climate	 change:	 Towards	 a	
European	framework	for	action’,	sets	out	several	measures	on	adaptation	(European	Commission,	2009).	The	overall	
aim	of	 the	EU	strategy	on	adaptation	to	climate	change	 is	 to	contribute	to	a	more	climate-resilient	Europe.	This	
means	enhancing	 the	preparedness	and	capacity	 to	 respond	to	 the	 impacts	of	climate	change	at	 local,	 regional,	
national	and	EU	 levels,	developing	a	coherent	approach	and	 improving	coordination.	This	 includes	strategies	 for	
information	sharing,	and	ensuring	that	adaptation	considerations	are	addressed	in	all	relevant	EU	policies.	
In	summary,	it	can	be	identified	that	a	lack	of	expertise,	capacity,	resources,	information,	competing	priorities	and	
uneven	distribution	of	 resources	 act	 as	major	 barriers	 to	 integration	of	 CCA	and	DRR.	 Furthermore,	 in	 order	 to	
overcome	these	barriers,	coordinated	actions,	collaboration	responsibilities	and	investment	in	capacity	building	at	
the	 local	 level,	 coordination	 with	 communities,	 and	 information	 and	 resource	 sharing	 have	 been	 identified	 as	
recommended	future	strategies.	
3.4 Lack	of	funding	
Funding	systems	are	also	a	common	barrier	to	CCA	and	DRR	integration	and	have	been	identified	as	a	global	issue	
by	interview	respondents	(see	Appendix	01).	In	some	cases,	there	is	a	lack	of	funding	for	CCA/DRR	activities.	In	other	
cases,	 a	 lack	 of	 funding	may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 the	 issue,	 but	 the	way	 in	which	 it	 is	 appropriated	 that	 hinders	
integration.	 Commonly,	 there	 is	 greater	 funding	 for	 emergency	 response	 over	 preparedness	 and	 risk	 reduction	
(examples	include	the	UK,	Italy	and	parts	of	Asia	and	Africa;	see	Appendix	01).	According	to	IFRC	(2016),	of	the	total	
amount	 of	 finance	 allocated	 to	 disasters,	 65.5%	 goes	 on	 emergency	 response,	 while	 only	 12.8%	 is	 spent	 on	
anticipatory	DRR.	In	addition,	funding	is	often	made	available	for	CCA	over	DRR,	as	is	the	case	in	Denmark	(Lauta	et	
al.,	2017),	Germany	(Marx	et	al.,	2017)	the	UK	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	Preferential	funding	for	CCA	may	be,	in	
part,	linked	to	political	priorities	(discussed	further	in	Section	3.5).		
Funding	for	CCA	and	DRR	comes	from	multiple	different	streams.	In	Germany,	due	to	the	various	funding	schemes	
in	existence,	there	is	a	lack	of	awareness	of	the	funding	available	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	In	Switzerland,	there	is	no	clear	
view	of	public	funding	flows,	as	reviews	are	not	made	on	a	regular	or	systematic	basis.	As	a	result,	identifying	funds	
and	steering	them	towards	priority	projects	can	be	difficult	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	As	funding	comes	from	different	
places,	the	ways	in	which	funding	can	be	used	may	be	limited	by	the	scope	of	interest	of	the	donor	organization,	or	
the	remit	of	government-funded	programmes	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	This	may	result	in	funds	not	being	made	
available	for	combined	CCA	and	DRR	activities.	Countries	deficient	in	funds	may	be	reliant	on	donor	contributions	
for	CCA	and	DRR.	Under	the	Paris	Agreement,	developed	nations	have	an	obligation	to	provide	funding	to	developing	
countries	(SPC	et	al.,	2016).	Such	contributions	may	be	targeted	at	actions	deemed	important	by	the	donor	and	may	
not	always	meet	the	exacting	needs	of	the	recipient	country,	causing	difficulties	in	the	implementation	of	CCA	and	
DRR	efforts	on	the	ground.	
As	Ettinger	et	al.	(2017)	highlight	for	the	French	context,	greater	coherency	and	efficiency	of	funding	mechanisms	is	
needed	to	bring	 together	 funding	 flows.	A	clearer	picture	of	available	 funding,	with	systematic	 reporting,	would	
allow	for	greater	visibility	and	awareness.	More	flexibility	in	donor	funding	allocation	and	involvement	of	recipients	
in	the	process	would	ensure	donations	meet	the	needs	of	recipient	countries.	This	is	reflected	in	the	Sustainable	
Development	 Goals	 (SDGs)	 commitment	 to	 enhancing	 the	 voice	 and	 participation	 of	 developing	 countries	 in	
international	 economic	 decision	 making	 (Amaratunga	 et	 al.,	 2017b).	 Adding	 to	 this,	 Calliari	 and	Mysiak	 (2013)	
highlighted	the	importance	of	combining	all	of	the	funding	instruments	by	enhancing	coherence	within	the	post-
2015	development	agenda.	
3.5 Political	awareness	and	risk	perception	
Political	awareness,	perceptions	and	preferential	attention	for	certain	DRR	or	CCA	aspects	can	result	in	imbalances	
between	CCA	and	DRR	that	act	to	prevent	effective	integration.	 In	some	cases,	there	is	 limited	awareness	of	the	
need	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR	in	the	first	instance.	As	one	interview	respondent	noted,	in	order	to	tackle	CCA	and	
DRR	integration	“…being	aware	of	the	problem	is	obviously	the	first	step”	(Appendix	01).	For	example,	in	Italy	the	
introduction	of	climate	change	as	a	policy	issue	has	been	relatively	recent,	therefore,	there	is	little	awareness	of	the	
need	to	integrate	CCA	with	DRR	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).		
In	addition,	there	is	often	a	limited	perception	of	existing	disaster	risk.	In	Italy,	the	assessment	of	risk	is	still	in	its	
infancy	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017),	while	in	Germany	there	is	no	comprehensive	natural	hazards	risk	overview	available	
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(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	In	Switzerland,	there	is	limited	risk	perception	for	new	climate	risks	and	a	reluctance	to	perceive	
these	 risks	 as	 problematic	 (Booth	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Such	 lack	 of	 risk	 perception	 hinders	 the	 implementation	 and	
integration	of	CCA	and	DRR,	as	there	is	no	perception	that	work	needs	to	be	done.	However,	there	are	examples	of	
countries	attempting	to	assess	existing	risks.	For	example,	the	UK	has	the	National	Risk	Register	of	Civil	Emergencies,	
which	is	a	five-yearly	review	of	potential	disasters	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	There	are	also	attempts	at	the	EU	
level,	with	the	Civil	Protection	Mechanism	(CPM)	(ECHO,	2017)	requiring	member	states	to	submit	risk	assessments,	
in	an	effort	to	foster	a	culture	of	risk	prevention	(Lauta		et	al.,	2017).	Once	existing	risks	have	been	identified,	an	
acceptable	level	of	risk	must	then	be	determined	to	identify	suitable	actions	for	implementation,	although	in	many	
cases	 this	 is	 also	 lacking.	 For	 example,	 in	 Italy,	 difficulties	 in	 determining	 an	 acceptable	 level	 of	 risk	 have	 been	
identified	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).		
The	EU	Floods	Directive	(EFD)	provides	an	example	of	best	practice	in	raising	awareness	of	risk.	The	EFD	required	EU	
member	states	to	undertake	comprehensive	food	risk	assessments,	produce	flood	risk	maps	and	to	develop	flood	
risk	management	plans	for	the	identified	hazardous	zones	(European	Commission,	2017a).	In	making	countries	take	
action	the	EFD	raised	awareness	of	flood	risk.	Requiring	members	to	review	their	risk	assessments	every	six	years	
keeps	the	issue	of	flood	risk	at	the	forefront	of	peoples’	minds.		
In	terms	of	awareness	of	international	frameworks,	expert	interviews	revealed	that	often,	actors	were	only	aware	
of	 the	 framework	 pertaining	 to	 their	 area	 of	 expertise.	 For	 example,	 CCA	 actors	 were	 only	 aware	 of	 the	 Paris	
Agreement	and	could	not	comment	on	the	SFDRR.	In	general,	there	appeared	to	be	greater	awareness	of	the	Paris	
Agreement	than	for	the	SFDRR	(see	Appendix	01).	This	may	be	linked	with	the	legally	binding	nature	of	the	Paris	
Agreement	having	led	to	greater	political	awareness	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	A	lack	of	reciprocal	understanding	
further	contributes	to	the	implementation	of	joint	goals,	as	there	is	no	awareness	of	the	overlaps.	For	information	
on	risk	perception	amongst	the	general	public,	see	Section	4.5.		
3.6 Inadequate	platforms	for	stakeholder	communication	and	engagement	
The	effective	integration	of	CCA	with	DRR	requires	the	participation	of	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders:	policy	makers,	
private	 companies,	 scientists,	 NGOs,	 and	 educators	 (IPCC,	 2012,	 UNISDR,	 2009).	 Multi-stakeholder	 and	 multi-
sectoral	processes	are	vital	in	building	common	understanding,	commitment	and	consensus	(UNISDR,	2009).	Within	
this	context,	communication	between	CCA	and	DRR	stakeholders	becomes	an	important	issue	for	sustainable,	long-
term	 integration	 of	 DRR	 and	 CCA.	 However,	 there	 are	 several	 issues	 surrounding	 CCA/DRR	 stakeholder	
communication	to	be	overcome.		
Firstly,	CCA	terminology	tends	to	be	more	technical	or	scientific,	which	cannot,	or	is	more	difficult	to,	translate	into	
simpler	language.	As	a	result,	it	is	difficult	to	communicate	at	the	community	level	where	DRR	actions	take	place.	In	
a	similar	vein,	the	DRR	and	CCA	communities	focus	on	different	types	of	data,	that	cannot	be	readily	combined.	For	
example,	 the	 climate	 change	 community	mainly	 focuses	 on	 data	 pertaining	 to	 the	 physical	 climate	 system	 and	
climate	projections,	while	the	DRR	community	mainly	focus	on	social	data	of	risk	and	vulnerabilities	(Amaratunga	et	
al.,	2017b).	
Another	obstacle	to	successful	communication	between	DRR	and	CCA	communities	is	the	diverse	spectrum	of	the	
respective	communities	and	their	different	perceptions.	There	are	many	different	people	involved	in	DRR	and	CCA	
activities,	with	many	not	experts	in	either	CCA	or	DRR.	Consequently,	different	stakeholders	define	DRR	and	CCA	
concepts	as	per	their	knowledge	spectrum.	This	has	created	many	diverse	terminologies	for	both	DRR	and	CCA	(see	
also	Section	4.6).	This	leads	to	the	need	for	a	common	language	or	standard	definitions	at	the	national	levels.	The	
issue	pertains	not	to	the	availability	of	global	terminologies,	which	have	already	been	developed	by	organizations	
such	as	the	UNISDR,	but	that	some	nations	are	not	adopting	them.	Also,	effective	communication	between	the	DRR	
and	CCA	communities	is	hindered	as	a	result	of	their	perceptions	towards	the	two	disciplines.	The	CCA	community	
believes	that	CCA	is	more	advanced	and	strong,	whereas	DRR	is	considered	as	non-scientific.	Therefore,	they	are	not	
keen	to	maintain	a	direct	communication	with	DRR	communities	as	they	believe	DRR	is	only	something	to	do	with	
an	emergency	response	but,	not	for	long-term	disaster	management	planning	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
As	 (Lauta	 et	 al.,	 2017)	 highlight,	 in	 Denmark,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 need	 for	 greater	 communication	 between	 actors,	
however,	there	is	currently	no	means	for	this	to	take	place.	There	is	also	no	clear	notion	of	whose	responsibility	it	is	
to	coordinate	such	an	effort.	Looking	at	ways	forward,	for	Germany	suggest	that	a	central	platform	for	the	sharing	
of	best	practices	would	allow	CCA	and	DRR	actors	to	learn	from	the	actions	of	others	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	With	regards	
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to	 the	 Swiss	 context,	 Booth	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 note	 that	 new	 ideas	 and	 solutions	 are	 most	 often	 generated	 at	 the	
community	level,	as	local	citizens	are	often	the	most	greatly	impacted.	Accordingly,	a	mechanism	via	which	to	share	
local	experiences	could	be	particularly	valuable	in	providing	novel	solutions.	However,	there	must	also	be	a	clear	
notion	of	who	will	take	responsibility	for	this	coordination	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017).	
In	terms	of	best	practice,	in	Germany	there	are	several	examples	of	working	groups	and	alliances	which	exemplify	
how	 stakeholders	 can	 be	 brought	 together.	 For	 example,	 the	 working	 group	 “Klimawandel	 und	 Anpassung	 im	
Katastrophenschutz”	(“climate	change	and	adaptation	in	disaster	protection”)	brings	together	a	wide	range	of	actors	
working	in	DRR	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	Another	example	can	be	drawn	from	The	Netherlands	Delta	Programme.	The	
programme	aims	to	protect	the	Netherlands	from	flooding,	now	and	in	the	future	and	brings	together	stakeholders	
from	the	central	government,	provincial	and	municipal	authorities,	water	boards	and	civil	society	organisations.	The	
programme	 explicitly	 acknowledges	 itself	 as	 a	 potential	 model	 of	 good	 practice	 and	 is	 keen	 to	 share	 water	
management	 expertise	 with	 others	 (Government	 of	 The	 Netherlands,	 2017).	 In	 bringing	 all	 stakeholder	 groups	
together	around	specific	projects,	the	programme	ultimately	develops	better	communication	channels	between	CCA	
and	DRR	stakeholders	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	The	SFDRR	also	provides	an	example	of	a	platform	that	has	been	
used	for	CCA	and	DRR	stakeholder	communication,	and	has	encouraged	CCA/	DRR	stakeholders	to	attend	the	same	
conferences,	minimising	separation	between	them	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
3.7 Unequal	attention	paid	to	CCA	and	DRR	
Differing	perceptions	of	risk	can	impact	upon	the	way	decisions	are	made	and	the	way	actions	are	prioritised.	The	
synthesis	of	national	studies	revealed	that	in	several	countries,	CCA	receives	much	greater	political	attention	than	
DRR.	This	includes	Denmark,	Germany	and	the	UK.	For	example,	in	Denmark	CCA	receives	greater	attention	due	to	
Copenhagen’s	image	as	a	‘green’	city,	resting	on	the	notion	of	‘added	value’	in	which	benefits	for	tourism	and	the	
economy	 are	 central	 in	 CCA	 initiatives	 (Lauta	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Preferential	media	 coverage	 of	 climate	 change	 and	
growing	popular	interest	in	the	issue	both	contribute	to	disparities	in	political	attention	and	funding	(Amaratunga	
et	al.,	2017b).	On	the	other	hand,	in	Italy,	climate	change	is	an	issue	that	has	only	recently	been	introduced	into	the	
policy	arena	and	has	not	yet	gained	traction	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	In	France,	the	CCA	community	is	primarily	one	of	
research,	with	operational	objectives	only	recently	being	introduced	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	Globally,	in	Australia	and	
the	 USA,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 CCA	 receives	 very	 little	 attention	 due	 to	 the	 political	 sensitivity	 of	 climate	 change	
(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
Although	political	 attention	may	be	 given	 to	CCA,	 this	 does	not	 always	 translate	 to	positive	CCA	actions	on	 the	
ground,	 as	 in	 some	 cases	 it	 is	 used	 as	 a	 scapegoat	 for	 other	 developmental	 challenges	 (Kelman	 et	 al.,	 2017).	
Furthermore,	 in	Germany	 and	Denmark,	 research	 projects	 are	 known	 to	 have	 been	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 climate	
change	so	that	they	are	eligible	for	certain	funding	schemes	(Marx	et	al.,	2017,	Lauta	et	al.,	2017).	Even	if	there	is	
political	 will	 for	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 integration,	 willingness	 can	 often	 be	 hampered	 by	 the	 existing	 legal	 and	 policy	
frameworks.	 For	 example,	 political	 willingness	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 France	 by	 the	 renewal	 of	 the	 National	
Adaptation	Plan,	but	a	lack	of	available	methodologies	for	CCA	hindered	the	actioning	of	this	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	
Schemes	such	as	the	EFD,	may	help	to	mitigate	this	problem	by	holding	members	accountable	for	their	actions.	For	
example,	the	EFD	monitors	how	well	Member	States	follow	their	reporting	obligations,	and	scores	them	on	their	
actions	which	encourages	members	to	follow	up	on	their	commitments	(European	Commission,	2017a).		
3.8 Conflicting	priorities	between	disaster	response	and	risk	reduction	
Although	CCA	in	some	instances	receives	greater	political	attention,	in	the	DRR	domain,	the	focus	is	often	given	to	
emergency	response	rather	than	risk	reduction	activities.	In	Germany	and	the	UK,	the	reason	for	this	may	be	that	
civil	protection	is	legally	binding,	whereas	other	aspects	are	not	(Marx	et	al.,	2017,	Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	In	the	
UK,	key	funds	are	only	allocated	to	emergency	response	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	In	the	global	context,	it	is	noted	
that	in	the	USA	funding	only	becomes	available	after	a	disaster	has	occurred	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	Similar	to	
the	UK	and	Germany,	in	most	of	the	Asian	countries,	the	focus	is	on	short-term	emergency	response	activities	rather	
than	on	long	term	DRR	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
A	disaster	often	prompts	reassessment	of	existing	policies	and	can	be	a	driver	for	rethinking	regulations	and	longer-
term	solutions,	as	identified	in	the	French	national	report	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	However,	examples	from	Germany	
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indicate	that	political	will	and	incentives	for	investments	for	longer-term	solutions	decrease	over	time,	as	people	
forget	about	the	impacts	a	disaster	has	had	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	
There	is	a	clear	need	for	a	longer-term	vision,	rather	than	merely	addressing	the	immediate	issues	(Amaratunga	et	
al.,	2017b).	One	method	suggested	frequently	in	the	primary	data	is	to	shift	the	focus	from	the	notion	of	separate	
CCA	and	DRR	practices	to	a	more	holistic,	long-term	notion,	such	as	resilience	or	sustainable	development.	There	
has	been	a	significant	 increase	 in	the	use	of	 the	word	 ‘resilience’	 in	the	field	of	CCA,	which	has	resulted	 in	both	
research	and	practical	platforms	working	with	CCA	and	DRR	together,	especially	at	the	city	level.	Examples	of	this	in	
action	 include	 the	UNISDR	Making	Cities	Resilient	Campaign	and	 the	Rockefeller	 Foundation	100	Resilient	Cities	
project.	However,	it	has	also	been	suggested	that	there	needs	to	be	incentives	for	national	governments	to	take	a	
longer-term	approach,	which	is	currently	lacking	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	
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4 Challenge	two:	Bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	policy	
CCA	and	DRR	are	vastly	complex	processes,	and	rely	heavily	on	knowledge	to	formulate	effective	measures	(Lauta	
et	 al.,	 2017).	 Without	 sufficient	 or	 easily	 comprehendible	 information,	 CCA/DRR	 decisions	 cannot	 be	 made	
effectively.	However,	as	widely	recognized	across	many	different	policy	fields,	it	is	a	continuous	and	never-ending	
challenge	to	make	best	use	of	input	from	researchers	and	scientists.	In	addition,	too	little	effort	has	been	made	to	
bridge	the	gap	between	knowledge	producers	(scientists)	and	knowledge	users	(policy	makers)	 (Weichselgartner	
and	Kasperson,	2010).	Although	in	recent	years	the	EU	has	made	significant	efforts	to	include	science	in	decision	
making,	there	are	still	several	challenges	to	be	overcome.		
Firstly,	there	is	a	need	to	bring	academics	and	scientists	working	in	universities	or	public	institutions	closer	to	the	
policy	 level,	especially	 in	DRR.	Secondly,	academics	and	scientists	ought	to	acknowledge	that	public	officials	and	
politicians	need	to	be	presented	with	the	most	up-to	date	knowledge	in	a	form	that	is	free	from	jargon	and	esoteric	
language,	in	order	to	be	better	equipped	when	preparing	and	discussing	policies.	This	should	be	at	the	heart	of	the	
way	researchers	and	scientists	prepare	input	for	the	policy	domain,	as	well	as	for	stakeholders	more	generally,	with	
due	consideration	of	when	and	where	scientific	consultation	is	needed	for	policy	processes.	
Overall,	this	section	highlights	that	scientific	knowledge	needs	to	have	a	greater	impact	and	use	in	many	different	
arenas,	from	risk	assessments,	to	early	warning,	to	public	awareness.	Closing	the	science-policy	gap	concerns	not	
only	closer	connections	between	the	scientific	and	policy	domains,	but	also	fostering	integration	in	a	way	that	will	
enable	the	best	type	of	new	knowledge	to	be	channelled	in	the	right	directions,	which	will	eventually	lead	to	added	
value	in	terms	of	reducing	risks	and	creating	stronger	preparedness	structures	and	mechanisms	for	the	populations	
of	 Europe	 and	 beyond.	 This	 includes	 addressing	 the	 issue	 at	multiple	 scales,	 across	 different	 actors	 and	 across	
multiple	scientific	disciplines	as	argued	by	Pigeon	and	Weichselgartner	(2015).	
4.1 Inadequate	platforms	and	structures	for	bringing	science	closer	to	policy		
The	major	 issue	 confronting	 the	 integration	of	 science	 into	policy	 for	DRR	and	CCA	 is	 the	 lack	of	platforms	and	
structures	that	enable	the	transitions	and	transformations	of	knowledge	between	both	basic	and	applied	research,	
and	the	government	institutions	that	are	central	for	legislation	and	policy-making.	Generally,	there	is	a	desire	for	
scientists	 and	 researchers	working	 on	 CCA	 and	DRR	 related	 issues	 to	 be	more	 included	 in	 decision-	 and	 policy-
making.	Conversely,	there	is	also	a	general	recognition	of	the	importance	of	science	and	research	to	inform	policy	
from	the	side	of	the	policy-makers.	 In	Denmark	for	 instance,	there	seems	to	be	a	recognition	that	both	planners	
working	on	CCA-related	issues	and	emergency	response	officials	are	becoming	more	interested	in	what	researchers	
have	to	say,	exemplified	in	a	growing	number	of	networks	and	conference	events	that	include	both	practitioners,	
university	academics	and	other	relevant	stakeholders,	such	as	the	Water	in	Cities	(‘Vand	i	Byer’)	network	(Lauta	et	
al.,	2017).	
However,	there	is	also	a	need	for	researchers	to	acknowledge	the	complexity	of	the	knowledge	that	exists	in	these	
fields,	and	that	public	officials	need	to	allocate	an	enormous	amount	of	resources	to	condense	 long	reports	and	
scientific	findings,	in	order	for	them	to	be	understood	by	local	and	national	politicians.	One	of	the	most	concrete	
aspects	of	this	 issue	is	the	 lack	of,	and	need	for	more	mediating	and	facilitating	actors,	 institutions	or	platforms,	
which	enable	a	more	efficient,	productive	and	satisfying	transfer	of	knowledge	from	the	scientific/academic	domain	
to	the	policy	domain.	Employees	with	skills	that	can	act	as	intermediaries	and	translators	between	academia	and	
policy	 should	 be	 a	 priority,	 which	 in	 France	 have	 been	 called	 “mediators	 of	 science”	 (Ettinger	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 In	
Switzerland,	it	has	been	highlighted	that	research	institutions	need	to	be	more	proactive	in	facilitating	more	efficient	
transfer	of	research	into	policy	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	
It	has	also	been	noted	in	several	contexts	that	although	there	are	a	large	and	growing	number	of	research	projects	
involved	in	producing	knowledge	and	facilitating	collaboration	between	multiple	stakeholders,	there	is	a	need	for	
synthesis	and	compiling	the	lessons	learned.	In	Denmark,	for	instance,	there	is	a	need	for	synthesizing	results	from	
research	projects,	rather	than	one	project	taking	over	from	the	next	one.	As	one	respondent	in	the	study	expressed:	
“there	needs	to	be	innovation	to	challenge	the	way	we	have	done	things	and	do	things	differently”.	A	logical	way	
forward	to	address	this	issue	is	to	facilitate	arenas,	events	and	platforms	that	allow	for	collaboration	and	synthesis	
of	research	across	university	and	research	institutions	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017).	Good	examples	of	such	arrangements	do	
exist.	 In	 Germany,	 for	 instance,	 the	 DKK	 (German	 Climate	 Consortium)	 has	 brought	 together	 several	 scientific	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Page	15	of	41	
	
institutions	since	2008	to	synthetize	scientific	findings	on	climate	change	and	has	provided	joined	assessments	(Marx	
et	al.,	2017).	In	Switzerland,	the	recognition	of	this	gap	gave	rise	to	the	creation	of	The	Mobiliar	Lab	for	Natural	Risks	
in	2013,	a	private/public	partnership	hosted	at	Universität	Bern	to	bridge	the	interdisciplinary	gap	between	science	
and	application	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	
There	are	also	good	examples	of	communication	between	the	academic	community	and	practitioners	working	in	
CCA	and	DRR.	For	example,	many	UK	universities	have	collaborations	with	national	level	organizations.	There	are	
also	non-government	institutions	active	in	DRR	which	sponsor	PhD	students	in	order	to	maintain	communication	
links	with	the	scientific	community.	In	addition,	the	Environment	Agency,	which	is	a	government	level	institution	in	
the	UK,	has	strong	links	and	collaborations	with	many	leading	universities.	
There	are	several	initiatives	across	the	globe	that	were	created	to	foster	collaboration	between	science	and	policy.	
Some	of	them	include	the	Integrated	Research	on	Disaster	Risk	Programme,	the	World	Bank’s	Global	Facility	for	DRR	
and	the	Belmont	Forum	among	many	others.	Despite	this,	very	few	of	these	initiatives	have	a	strong	institutional	
basis	 and	 they	have	 varying	 success	 rates.	 For	 example,	 the	 IRDR	 receives	 little	 funding	 and	 changes	 in	 leading	
personnel	 have	 hampered	 the	 programme.	 One	 of	 the	 pressing	 needs	 at	 this	 juncture	 is	 to	 push	 for	 stronger	
institutions	that	will	play	a	bridging	role	to	bring	science	and	policy	closer.	
At	the	EU	level,	one	such	initiative	is	the	Joint	Research	Centre	(JRC),	the	European	Commission's	initiative	for	science	
and	knowledge.	The	main	tasks	of	the	JRC	is	to	provide	scientific	advice	to	EU	policy	on	different	subjects.	Over	the	
years,	greater	emphasis	has	been	placed	on	research	into	societal	safety	and	security	(where	CCA	and	DRR	form	a	
large	component).	In	addition,	the	Disaster	Risk	Management	Knowledge	Centre	was	created	at	the	EU	level	with	
the	 aim	 of	working	 towards	 partnerships;	 innovation	 and	 knowledge	management.	 The	 European	 Environment	
Agency	(EEA)	also	play	a	key	role	in	the	provision	of	information	on	the	environment	to	those	involved	in	developing,	
adopting,	implementing	and	evaluating	policy	and	for	the	public	also	(European	Environment	Agency,	2017).	
However,	there	are	also	 indications	that	science	and	policy	cooperation	is	often	done	to	given	an	appearance	of	
integration,	while	the	scientific	input	is	none-the-less	not	followed	further	down	the	line.	This	is	particularly	evident	
when	moving	outside	of	the	EU	(Appendix	01).	An	interview	with	an	expert	from	the	Philippines	sums	up	the	nature	
of	cooperation	as	the	respondent	states	“…just	to	make	people	feel	that	they	are	consulting	scientists.	Like	a	token.	
Our	policies	are	based	on	consultations	with	these,	but	it	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	that	they	are	following,	or	that	
they	are	trying	to	apply	what	the	scientists	are	providing	them.”	Likewise,	another	respondent	stated	“I	think	we	set	
up	some	structures	that	will	more	or	less	address	that,	but	these	are	not	really	that	institutionalized,	meaning	that	
there	is	not	really	an	office	that	will	specifically	look	into,	monitor,	and	find	out	what…	how	are	we	complying	or	
performing	in	terms	what	is	expected	of	our	country	in	terms	of	the	Sendai	framework.	I	don’t	think	there	are	the	
specific	resources	allocated	for	that	purpose.”	
While	the	wish	to	work	towards	bringing	science	and	policy	closer	is	acknowledged,	this	cannot	progress	without	
addressing	 the	 barriers	 that	 hinder	 such	 cooperation.	 They	 go	 back	 to	 issues	 of	 institutional	management	 and	
addressing	clear	roles	and	mandates	to	facilitate	such	a	dialogue	that	will	influence	policy.	There	is	also	keen	interest	
among	humanitarian	organisations	to	work	with	science	and	research	more	than	before.	To	name	one	such	recent	
example,	the	Save-University	Partnership	for	Education	Research	(SUPER)	Initiative	created	by	Save	the	Children,	
seeks	to	build	mutually	beneficial	projects	for	researchers	and	local	communities	across	different	national	contexts.	
This	initiative	grants	academic	experts	an	opportunity	to	strengthen	their	careers	by	providing	access	and	a	platform,	
while	informing	and	contributing	to	the	evidence	base	of	Save	the	Children’s	programmes.	
4.2 Demand	for	risk	expertise	in	public	institutions	
The	issue	of	risk	expertise	 in	public	 institutions	overlaps	 in	significant	ways	with	the	previous	discussion	(Section	
4.1).	The	need	for	employees	with	skills	and	knowhow	in	risk	and	vulnerability	analysis	was	identified	for	several	
countries,	including	the	UK,	France,	Denmark	and	Switzerland	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a;	Ettinger	et	al.,	2017;	Lauta	
et	al.,	2017;	Booth	et	al.,	2017).	The	issue,	as	highlighted	in	the	case	of	the	UK,	concerns	not	only	the	lack	of	risk	
experts	 in	public	governance	institutions	(municipalities	and	ministries),	but	also	 in	private	companies	and	NGOs	
(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	In	Switzerland,	for	example,	it	was	highlighted	how	practical-based	research	has	found	
it	very	difficult	to	source	money	for	project	proposals,	prompting	the	Swiss	Federal	offices	to	upgrade	their	support	
in	 this	 area	 (Booth	 et	 al.,	 2017).	One	of	 the	 important	 aspects	 of	 this	 issue	 is	 also	 that	 there	 is	 a	 gap	between	
academics	and	practitioners	working	on	similar	problems	in	DRR	and	CCA,	but	who	are	seldom	in	dialogue.	There	
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has	 been	 voiced	 a	 need	 for	 institutions	 or	 actors	 that	 could	 act	 as	 “mediators	 of	 science”	 for	 practitioners,	 in	
particular	for	local	authorities	and	their	staff.	
A	related	issue	is	the	role	of	private	consultancies	doing	risk	assessments	for	government	entities	at	different	levels.	
In	 the	 case	of	Denmark,	 some	government	 institutions	 tasked	with	overseeing	policy	 in	 relation	 to	 flooding	 are	
questioning	the	soundness	and	quality	of	reports	and	assessments	conducted	by	private	consultancies:	“The	role	of	
consultancies,	is	often	also	seen	to	be	problematic,	because	they	have	different	departments	that	advise	on	different	
things”	as	one	municipal	officer	explained	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017).	Although	private	consultancies	lift	a	heavy	work	load	
for	municipalities,	three-way	cooperation	forms	could	be	developed	better,	where	academics	act	as	validators	of	
reports	produced	by	consultancies.	
For	France,	it	has	been	noted	that	education	and	awareness	raising	is	important	for	building	disaster	resilience	not	
only	in	terms	of	enhancing	public	risk	perceptions,	but	also	to	equip	practitioners	with	the	skills	and	know-how	to	
utilize	advice	from	the	scientific	community	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	There	needs	to	be	an	attentiveness	to	educating,	
employing	and	nurturing	people	with	the	right	kind	of	skills	and	knowledge,	lest	the	value	of	science	and	research	
in	DRR	and	CCA	will	not	be	anchored	in	a	sustainable	manner	in	policy	institutions	and	legislative	bodies.	
A	related	issue	regards	the	transferability	of	academic	research	into	arenas	where	practitioners	operate.	Useful	tools	
and	 techniques	 are	 developed	 from	 academic	 research,	 but,	 there	 is	 no	 proper	 platform	 to	 transfer	 these	 into	
practice.	For	example,	in	most	cases	in	Asia,	new	tools	and	techniques	for	DRR	and	CCA	are	tried	and	evaluated	only	
for	academic	research	and	are	not	transferred	into	practice.	As	a	result,	when	practitioners	need	to	address	issues,	
they	have	 to	 follow	 the	 same	old	 tools	 and	 techniques.	 Similarly,	 academic	 research	 is	often	done	only	 as	pilot	
projects.	 Even	when	 pilot	 projects	 are	 carried	 out	 in	 collaboration	with	 practitioners,	 the	 results	 are	 not	 often	
replicated	as	a	part	of	a	process	since	there	is	no	funding	available	for	this.	For	example,	pilot	projects	implemented	
in	one	part	of	Thailand	were	not	replicated	in	other	areas	of	the	country	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017b).	
A	 related	 but	 central	 issue	 is	 the	 need	 to	 address	 gaps	 in	 regulation	 concerning	 liability	 and	 accountability	 of	
scientists	 and	 policymakers	 in	 relation	 to	 civil	 protection	 and	 DRR,	 especially	 concerning	 early	 warnings,	 risk	
assessments	and	building	codes.	This	issue	became	most	clearly	visible	during	and	after	the	L’Aquila	earthquake	in	
Central	 Italy	 (Zuccaro	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Although	 these	 issues	 might	 appear	 to	 be	 most	 urgent	 in	 the	 context	 of	
earthquakes	given	the	fast	onset	and	damaging	character	of	such	events,	examples	of	controversies	over	liability	
and	accountability	 in	relation	to	storms,	storm	surges,	and	flooding	 in	other	parts	of	Europe	testify	to	the	 larger	
relevance	of	this	issue.	
4.3 Lack	of	available	risk	data	on	vulnerability	
Across	the	national	reports,	there	is	an	identifiable	need	for	more	sophisticated,	accessible	and	better	structured	
data	 for	 risk	 and	 vulnerability	 assessments,	 considered	 vital	 for	 DRR	 policies	 and	 actions.	 Furthermore,	 some	
countries	have	reported	a	lack	of	assessments	at	the	national,	regional	and	local	levels	that	go	beyond	looking	at	
hazards	 towards	 vulnerability	 of	 all	 kinds.	 Risk	 assessments	 that	 are	 based	 mainly	 on	 hazards	 rather	 than	
vulnerabilities,	and	on	damages	to	material	assets	rather	than	on	social	and	psychological	forms	of	vulnerability,	are	
not	adequate	to	address	the	challenges	of	future	disasters	and	climate	change	impacts.	
While	several	good	mechanisms	and	practices	have	been	developed	for	sharing	risk	data	and	communication	on	
risk,	 these	 data	 sources	 are	 not	 widely	 available	 to	 private	 actors	 and	 scientists	 due	 to	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	
information.	For	Germany,	there	is	a	need	to	make	data	more	available,	accessible	and	complete.	This	is	especially	
important	for	disaster	loss	data.	Common	guidelines	and	tools	for	collecting,	storing	and	communicating	risk	data	
to	those	who	need	them	is	currently	lacking	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	For	Italy,	risk	assessments	and	preventative	actions	
have	progressed	slowly.	Here,	a	gap	has	been	identified	in	terms	of	the	lack	of	methodologies	and	tools	for	building	
comprehensive	and	holistic	risk	assessments	that	take	into	account	hazards,	exposure	and	vulnerability	under	one	
roof	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	As	vulnerability	information	is	lacking,	risk	maps	are	also	not	present	or	are	inadequate.	
As	a	consequence,	emergency	plans	are	formulated	on	hazards	rather	than	on	risk,	which	excludes	vulnerability	and	
exposure.	In	Italy,	there	is	a	need	for	more	data	availability	and	reliability,	common	approaches	and	methodologies,	
and	more	 involvement	 of	 the	 scientific	 community.	 Obstacles	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 effective	DRR	 and	 CCA	
integrated	policies	 lie	 in	 the	 limited	political	 and	 institutional	 awareness	of	 the	problems.	 There	 are	 substantial	
challenges	 in	 incorporating	 findings	 from	 scientific	 research	 and	 technological	 innovations	 into	 governance	 and	
policy,	but	they	still	rarely	find	concrete	applications	in	governance	measures.		
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In	France,	a	need	for	better	standardizations	of	risk	evaluations	has	also	been	identified	across	the	different	
regions	of	the	country	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	This	also	includes	the	availability	and	scope	of	what	is	included,	such	
as	risk	information	from	the	lowest	administrative	levels	(municipality/commune)	not	being	available	on	the	ONRN	
(‘Observatoire	National	des	Risques	Naturels’	or	‘National	Natural	Risk	Observatory’)	platform.	There	also	needs	to	
be	a	better	coverage	of	the	risk	profiles	of	key	societal	institutions.	For	instance,	not	all	schools	and	hospitals	have	
been	risk	evaluated	in	the	sense	of	providing	all	the	information	necessary	to	integrate	them	into	planning	and	
development	decisions.	Regional	and	local	levels	also	need	to	have	regular	updated	versions	of	natural	hazard	and	
risk	evaluations.	Finally,	there	is	a	need	to	move	beyond	focusing	solely	on	damages	to	material	assets,	and	focus	
more	on	the	vulnerability	of	human	safety	(human	indicators).	
Access	to	data	was	cited	as	one	of	the	foremost	issues	in	risk	assessment	from	the	global	survey	conducted	in	2017	
for	the	ESPREssO	project.	This	problem	is	further	exacerbated	by	the	demarcation	of	risk	and	vulnerability	data.	The	
two	frames	of	risk	vulnerability	assessments	have	been	divided	based	on	disciplines	or	research	designs	(qualitative	
and	 quantitative).	 For	 example,	 risk	 assessments	 are	 primarily	 technically	 oriented	 using	 risk	 matrices,	 while	
vulnerability	 assessments	 may	 be	 conducted	 using	 the	 Red	 Cross	 methodology	 of	 Vulnerability	 and	 Capacity	
Assessments	(VCA)	toolbox	(IFRC,	2007).	
Stang	and	Dimsdale	(2017)	argue	that	risk	assessments	are	siloed	as	“there	is	no	formal	cooperative	process	for	EU	
institutions	and	member	states	to	work	together	in	pursuing	appropriate	cooperative	responses	to	identified	climate	
risks”.	This	could	perhaps	be	one	of	the	reasons	why	risk	assessments	continue	to	be	based	on	either	qualitative	or	
quantitative	methods.	This	is	also	reflected	in	the	division	between	analysing	risk	and	vulnerability.	
Finally,	Poljansek	et	al.	(2017)	identify	that	CCA	and	DRR	“rely	on	the	availability	of	robust	knowledge	and	data	at	all	
levels.	Knowledge	and	data	are	key	in	defining	scenarios	and	projections	according	to	which	adaptation	measures	
are	developed,	in	monitoring	progress	of	implementation	and	in	developing	innovative	instruments/tools	to	increase	
resilience”.	However,	within	the	scientific	community	there	may	be	many	differences.	For	years,	we	have	debated	
the	definition	and	scope	of	disasters	and	adaptation.	To	complicate	 things,	different	studies	may	show	different	
results.	To	provide	an	example,	according	to	Kundzewicz	et	al.	(2017),	flooding	impacts	have	been	shown	differently	
in	 studies	 over	 time.	 This	 may	 be	 due	 to	 availability	 of	 data	 or	 even	 attribution	 of	 events	 to	 climate	 change.	
Nonetheless,	these	differences	make	it	complicated	for	policy	makers	to	draw	evidence	or	follow	scientific	results	
closely.	They	suggest	that	“discrepancy	in	flood	hazard	projections	raises	caution,	especially	among	decision	makers	
in	charge	of	water	resources	management,	flood	risk	reduction,	and	climate	change	adaptation	at	regional	to	local	
scales.	Because	 it	 is	naïve	to	expect	availability	of	trustworthy	quantitative	projections	of	 future	flood	hazard,	 in	
order	 to	 reduce	 flood	 risk,	 one	 should	 focus	 attention	on	mapping	of	 current	 and	 future	 risks	 and	 vulnerability	
hotspots	and	improve	the	situation	there	(ibid:1).	
4.4 Limited	scope	and	outlook	of	research	
There	are	three	points	relating	to	the	issue	of	a	lack	of	broad	scope	in	science	and	research	on	DRR	and	CCA:	1)	a	
focus	on	single	hazards	rather	than	a	multi-hazard	approach;	2)	a	stronger	scientific	focus	on	CCA	rather	than	DRR;	
and	3)	an	underrepresentation	of	the	social	sciences	(in	both	fields).	
Firstly,	 a	 focus	 on	 single	 hazards	 relates	 both	 to	 the	 limited	 perspectives	 of	 research	 and	 the	 centring	 on	
predominantly	one	type	of	hazard	(floods	in	Northern	Europe,	earthquakes	in	Italy,	etc.).	While	some	research	on	
disasters	might	 focus	on	many	different	hazards,	 these	 studies	often	have	an	 international	outlook.	Conversely,	
research	on	disaster	risks	nationally	focus	on	the	most	severe	and	pressing	types	of	hazards.	
For	Denmark,	it	has	been	noted	that	specific	hazard	types	attract	more	attention	than	others	if	these	have	happened	
most	recently.	This	is	most	visible	with	the	overwhelming	attention	to	cloud	burst	events,	foregrounding	the	need	
for	action	on	storm	surge	protection	and	preparedness,	which	are	potentially	more	damaging	and	costly	events	
(Lauta	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 This,	 however,	 is	 changing	 at	 the	 present	moment	 after	 several	 severe	 storm	 surge	 events	
recently	affected	Denmark.	There	needs	 to	be	more	attention	 from	the	 scientific	 community	on	 the	connection	
between	DRR	and	CCA	when	evaluating	single	extreme	events,	which	will	provide	a	better	knowledge	base	for	both	
short	and	long-term	planning.	Otherwise,	responses	to	disasters	will	be	reactive	in	nature,	and	will	focus	solely	on	
the	most	recent	events.	
While	all	global	 frameworks	suggest	a	more	holistic	and	multi-hazard	approach,	 it	 seems	much	more	difficult	 to	
achieve.	Kappes	et	al.	(2012)	identify	difficulties	in	comparing	different	hazards	to	be	one	of	the	challenges.	It	may	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Page	18	of	41	
	
also	be	due	to	 the	siloed	approach	within	 the	hazard	sciences.	Different	hazards	have	varied	approaches	 to	 risk	
assessments.	Further	work	needs	to	be	done	to	put	all	of	this	together.	Unfortunately,	there	may	be	factors	of	time	
and	funding	that	may	affect	this	process.	
Second,	the	limited	scope	of	research	also	concerns	the	balance	between	CCA	and	DRR.	In	Germany,	it	has	been	
identified	that	CCA	constitutes	a	more	popular	topic	for	research	compared	to	DRR,	with	16	papers	for	DRR	and	38	
papers	for	CCA	found	under	the	same	criteria	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	While	there	are	always	pitfalls	to	such	estimates,	
given	the	points	raised	in	the	section	on	challenge	1	(Chapter	3),	it	is	clear	that	the	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	also	
needs	to	be	addressed	at	the	level	of	academic	university	research	and	applied	research.	In	the	EU	context,	both	
academic	and	policy	institutions	seem	to	share	and	exchange	information	at	the	most	basic	level.	To	increase	the	
science-policy	interface,	there	is	clear	need	for	more	joint	and	collaborative	efforts	to	co-produce	knowledge.	This	
is	a	clear	direction	that	the	EU	seems	to	be	moving	towards	with	the	research	programmes	(Lauta		et	al.,	2017).		
Third,	there	is	an	identifiable	need	for	more	investments	in	the	social	sciences	on	risk	and	vulnerability	research,	as	
risks	are	social	phenomena.	A	longstanding	issue	in	DRR	practice	and	policy	is	the	dominance	of	the	hard	sciences	
and	quantitative	approaches,	and	the	underrepresentation	of	the	social	sciences	and	more	qualitative	approaches.	
For	instance,	a	German	academic	researcher	and	professor	points	out	that	“[natural]	scientific	approaches	influence	
the	 assessment	 of	 risk,	 because	 they	 place	more	 value	 on	 what	 can	 be	 quantified.	 It	 is	 always	 easier	 to	 push	
quantified	aspects	through.	They	are	easier	to	fund,	they	can	be	displayed,	they	are	easier	to	report,	etc.	While	this	
can	be	quite	productive,	risks	are	social	phenomena	and	can	mostly	not	be	evaluated	through	a	technical	formula.”		
The	tendency	is	also	visible	for	CCA.	A	study	on	climate	research	in	Denmark	from	2009,	for	instance,	highlights	that	
the	majority	of	research	lies	within	the	natural	sciences	(The	Ministry	of	Science	Technology	and	Innovation,	2009).	
There	is	a	recognition	from	respondents	that	there	needs	to	be	more	social	and	humanistic	perspectives	on	CCA,	
and	that	these	also	need	to	be	in	dialogue	with	the	hard	sciences.	The	scientific	knowledge	underpinning	policy-
making	and	 institutional	arrangements	 in	DRR	should	be	 incorporating	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	studies,	
requiring	again	both	natural	and	social	sciences.	Research	in	the	past	on	climate	change	and	vulnerability	has	largely	
taken	a	technocratic	approach	(Collette,	2016).	Although	there	is	a	growing	literature	from	a	social	angle,	there	is	
room	for	much	more	engagement.		
4.5 Low	public	awareness	of	disaster	risks	and	climate	change	impacts	
A	major	issue	related	to	the	relationship	between	science	and	policy	is	the	lack	of	public	awareness	of	disaster	risks,	
and	also	of	preparedness	for	emergency	response	in	relation	to	early	warnings	and	forecasts.	While	it	is	by	far	not	a	
new	 insight	 that	 public	 awareness	 of	 disaster	 risk	 is	 low	 or	 even	 absent,	 it	 was	 one	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	most	
consistently	and	clearly	across	almost	all	national	country	reports.		
For	the	UK,	it	was	found	that	even	though	the	government	organizations	communicate	to	the	community,	people	
are	 reluctant	 to	 appreciate	 them	 as	 they	 have	 the	 perception	 that	 a	 disaster	 is	 unlikely	 to	 happen	 to	 them	
(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	In	the	case	of	Denmark	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017),	several	public	officials	note	that	a	perception	
that	disasters	are	unlikely	to	impact	oneself	is	detectable	in	the	public.	Public	interest	in	disasters	is	high	when	events	
occur,	but	dwindle	quickly	thereafter,	and	are	almost	absent	in	periods	when	such	events	do	not	occur.	For	Italy	
(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017),	the	results	of	surveys	carried	out	in	risk-prone	areas	show	that	in	many	cases,	citizens	are	not	
aware	of	 the	 risks	 their	 community	 is	 exposed	 to,	 and	at	which	 level	 (for	 instance,	on	 volcanic	 and	 seismic	 risk	
perception)	(Barberi	et	al.,	2008,	Crescimbene	et	al.,	2014).	In	the	case	of	France,	a	recent	survey	found	that	78%	of	
French	people	are	unaware	of	what	to	do	in	the	event	that	France’s	national	alert	system	is	triggered,	and	63%	did	
not	 know	of	 the	 risks	 they	were	exposed	 to	 in	 their	 geographical	 location	 (Ettinger	 et	 al.,	 2017).	Generally,	 the	
perception	of	risk	 in	a	territory	 is	strongly	related	to	the	hazard	occurrence	and	existing	risk	culture.	 It	has	been	
observed	to	be	difficult	to	raise	when	no	event	has	occurred.		
For	CCA,	especially	where	it	overlaps	with	natural	hazards,	there	is	also	a	 lack	of	public	engagement.	For	several	
countries,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 that	 there	 are	 disagreements	 about	 the	 risks	 (scope,	 intensity,	 frequency,	 etc.)	
associated	with	climate	change	and	natural	hazards.	In	Denmark,	public	engagement	projects	have	been	sarcastically	
framed	by	several	public	officials	as	being	“pseudo-participatory”	in	character	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017).	There	are	many	
hearings	and	engagements	with	citizens,	but	these	are	often	only	structured	to	meet	legal	requirements.	There	is	a	
lack	of	a	recognized	body	amongst	local	citizens	and	responsible	authorities,	that	could	help	organize	the	resources	
from	civil	society,	either	by	incorporating	individual	citizens,	dike	associations	and	homeowners	associations	into	
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response	plans,	or	drawing	on	existing	civil	society	institutions	such	as	sports	associations	and	scouts	groups	(DEMA,	
2017).	 Recognized	 NGOs,	 especially	 the	 Red	 Cross,	 could	 have	 a	 stronger	 role	 to	 play	 during	 emergencies	 for	
incorporating	citizen	volunteers,	but	this	needs	to	be	addressed	and	recognized	by	the	national	and	local	emergency	
response	authorities.	
There	are	also	significant	differences	in	perceptions	regarding	the	impacts	of	long-term	climate	change.	In	the	UK	
some	believe	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 natural	 hazards	 to	 the	 economy,	 infrastructure	 and	 residents	will	 be	marginal,	
whereas	 others	 argue	 that	 the	 occurrence	 of	 extreme	weather	 events	will	 increase	 and	 climate	 effects	 will	 be	
significant	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	
A	related	issue	highlighted	in	the	Italian	and	UK	contexts	is	the	lack	of	DRR	education	and	awareness	in	schools	and	
educational	institutions	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a;	Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	There	is	general	agreement	that	strategies	
for	including	DRR	and	CCA	perspectives	in	schools	should	be	prioritized.	This	relates	both	to	raising	general	public	
awareness	about	current	and	future	risks	and	adaptation	options,	as	well	as	educating	a	work	force	that	will	have	
the	knowledge	and	skills	to	be	employed	in	the	CCA	and	DRR	domains	(see	also	Section	4.2).	A	respondent	from	the	
Maldives	notes	“only	those	who	have	formal	education	understand	those	things.	So,	it’s	very	difficult	for	us	to	go	
and	explain	what	climate	change	is	to,	let’s	say,	a	fisherman	who	has	not	done	formal	education”.	
Generally,	greater	efforts	for	enhancing	and	qualifying	the	communication	of	disasters	to	the	public	will	foster	better	
understandings	and	awareness	which	could	be	vital	 for	 influencing	government	priorities	from	the	bottom-up.	A	
more	 systematic,	 risk-informed	 approach	 in	 EU	 policies	 will	 also	 help	 to	 achieve	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 Sendai	
Framework	for	DRR	(Lauta		et	al.,	2017).		
In	a	recent	study	it	was	found	that	“54%	of	European	citizens	believe	that	humans	play	only	a	partial	role	or	no	role	
in	climate	change”	(Frontiers,	2017).	There	is	therefore	still	work	to	do	in	communicating	climate	change	science	to	
the	public.	A	study	conducted	in	Japan	shows	how	mass	media	can	influence	people’s	perceptions	and	awareness	
to	climate	change	issues.	The	study	revealed	that	with	increasing	attention	paid	by	coverage	to	issues	of	climate	
change,	it	led	to	an	increase	in	public	awareness	(Sampei	and	Aoyagi-Usui,	2009).		
4.6 Complex	scientific	terminology	
An	issue	that	has	been	reported	across	several	countries,	and	which	relates	to	the	previous,	is	the	complexity	and	
incomprehensible	terminology	and	jargon	of	researchers.	This	relates	both	to	public	dissemination	and	awareness	
raising,	as	well	as	to	the	 interface	between	public	officials	and	researchers.	 It	 is	 important	to	stress	that	science	
needs	 to	operate	with	 specific	 terminologies	which	enable	a	precision	and	 inquiry	 into	 the	phenomena	studied.	
However,	improving	upon	ways	that	scientists,	researchers	and	academics	might	develop	tools	for	changing	the	type	
of	language	they	use	would	help	their	work	have	more	impact.	This	is	not	a	question	of	“dumbing	down”	research,	
but	rather	to	find	new	ways	of	communicating	and	explaining	complex	issues	in	a	more	comprehensible	way.	
Interestingly	 enough,	 this	 issue	 also	 seems	 to	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 translation	 of	 knowledge	 and	 insights	
between	CCA	and	DRR	domains.	In	the	UK,	it	was	noted	how	CCA	terminology	is	more	technical	and	scientific	and	is	
rarely	translated	into	simple	English.	As	a	result,	it	is	a	challenge	to	effectively	communicate	CCA	messages	at	the	
community	level	of	DRR	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	
For	Germany,	it	has	been	noted	that	despite	the	existence	of	a	number	of	tools	and	guidelines	for	communicating	
messages	 from	science	to	policy	and	to	the	public,	 the	processes	of	communicating	so	that	 they	reach	the	right	
target	 groups	 is	 still	 a	 great	 challenge	 (Marx	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 This	 is	 especially	 pertinent	 at	 the	 municipal	 level.	
Additionally,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 for	 Switzerland	 that	 not	 only	 is	 technical	 and	 scientific	 terminology	 difficult	 to	
interpret	for	non-experts,	but	also	that	the	visualizations	(here	referring	specifically	to	synoptic	hazard	maps)	also	
contain	too	much	complex	information	which	hinders	easy	interpretation	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	For	the	Swiss	case,	it	
was	noted	that	hazard	maps	are	actually	one	of	the	areas	in	which	greater	synergy	between	CCA	and	DRR	can	be	
achieved	both	for	equipping	policy	makers	and	the	public	with	the	best	and	most	up	to	date	knowledge	on	risks.	
The	concepts	and	terminology	used	in	DRR	have	been	derived	and	defined	differently	in	different	languages.	In	many	
languages,	there	is	no	direct	translation	to	concepts	of	resilience	and	vulnerability	(Kelman	et	al.	2015).	While	the	
literal	problem	of	language	exists,	there	is	also	the	problem	of	using	concepts	differently.	All	the	more,	even	within	
scientific	disciplines,	we	see	a	huge	difference	in	the	understanding	of	disasters	which	makes	it	extremely	difficult	
to	communicate	in	one	scientific	discourse	to	the	policy	world.	It	is	also	essential	to	work	with	the	understanding	
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that	there	will	probably	never	be	one	definition	and	one	method	of	doing	this.	The	complexity	of	the	subject	is	to	
take	note	of	these	differences	and	be	able	to	draw	as	much	synergy	as	possible	between	various	disciplines.	
Our	understanding	of	concepts	and	terminology	creates	huge	problems	for	the	policy	world	due	to	ambiguity	and	
less	consensus.	Many	areas	of	research	are	contested	making	it	impossible	for	the	policy	makers	to	come	to	a	crisp	
conclusion.	Scientists	cannot	be	the	only	group	that	defines	and	assess	risk	and	global	issues,	which	needs	a	more	
holistic	approach	to	the	problem	(Wesselink	et	al.,	2013).	Furthermore,	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS),	an	
interdisciplinary	 field	of	 studies,	 shows	that	“processes	are	characterized	by	an	 interplay	of	 technical,	 social	and	
economic	discourses	in	ways	both	multi-scalar	and	cross-cultural	in	nature”	(Ibid:3).	Thus,	the	language,	ambiguity	
of	statements	and	advice	and	slower	nature	of	academic	communication	can	hinder	effective	influence	on	decision	
makers.	 This	 is	 of	 course	 an	 issue	 than	pertains	 to	 deeper	 questions	 about	 the	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	between	
different	domains	in	general.	The	problem	is	thus	also	one	of	epistemology,	or	how	science	comes	to	know	what	it	
knows,	implying	that	there	are	no	obvious	or	easy	solutions	that	can	be	applied	in	all	contexts	at	all	times.		
4.7 New	media	landscapes		
One	of	the	most	dynamic	and	rapidly	evolving	issues	related	to	this	challenge	is	the	role	of	the	media,	and	especially	
the	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 that	 social	 media	 presents.	 General	 distrust	 and	 scepticism	 about	 online	
information	and	news	impact	public	agencies’	emergency	communication.	This	is	coupled	with	a	lack	of	engagement	
with	social	media	by	authorities,	who	often	have	unclear	or	no	plans	or	strategies	for	reaching	out	to	the	public	via	
social	media	platforms,	and	 for	providing	authoritative	news	 in	emergencies.	People	 in	 the	UK,	 for	 instance,	are	
highly	active	on	social	networks	and	there	are	several	groups	who	circulate	false	information	on	social	media.	As	a	
result	of	this,	there	is	a	tendency	for	the	public	to	lose	trust	in	reliable	information	which	is	released	online,	even	by	
relevant	government	bodies	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	
The	opportunities	and	risks	associated	with	the	spread	of	social	media	in	disaster	situations	are	only	now	beginning	
to	be	studied	by	researchers.	For	this	reason,	there	is	substantial	focus	on	the	issues	of	the	spread	of	false	or	fake	
news	during	emergencies,	as	well	as	on	the	mobilization	of	citizens	through	social	media	platforms	(Alexander	2014).		
For	Denmark,	several	respondents	from	municipalities	and	national	agencies	highlighted	the	issue	of	social	media	
and	citizen-driven	 initiatives	as	a	challenge	that	will	demand	more	focus	 in	the	future	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017).	While	
some	municipalities	are	proactive	in	attempting	to	incorporate	citizens	via	the	popular	social	media	platforms,	for	
instance	 Vejle,	 many,	 including	 Copenhagen,	 are	 not.	 As	 one	 public	 official	 remarked:	 “The	 municipality	 of	
Copenhagen	is	not	prepared	for	the	social	media	challenge,	where	people	act	on	their	own	initiative.	This	means	
that	more	clear	leadership	is	needed	for	crisis	situations,	where	both	emergency	response	professionals	and	political	
leaders	take	a	more	proactive	lead.”		
While	dealing	with	false	information	and	engaging	citizens	through	social	media	platforms	are	new	and	emerging	
issues,	other	issues	that	have	been	discussed	for	years	are	still	present.	In	Switzerland,	a	worry	over	how	the	mass	
media	can	over-sensationalize	issues,	trends	and	practices	was	identified	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	A	media	landscape	in	
which	sensations	and	spectacles	are	in	high	demand	makes	some	stakeholders	wary	of	engaging	with	the	press,	for	
instance	individual	businesses	and	companies	with	perhaps	a	financial	risk	involved	in	communicating	their	plans.	
A	related	issue	is	that	the	interests	of	the	media	are	a	hindrance	for	effective	awareness	raising.	For	Italy,	 it	was	
highlighted	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 effective	 collaboration	 between	 decision	 makers	 and	 practitioners	 in	 civil	
protection	 and	 the	 media.	 A	 challenge	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 media	 actors	 have	 to	 increase	 their	 audience	 for	
commercial	purposes,	or	to	support	various	political	orientations	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	In	Switzerland,	once	again,	
there	 are	 concerns	 over	 how	media	 corporations	 sometimes	 distort	 climate	 trends,	 and	might	 be	 seen	 to	 lend	
support	to	short-sighted	measures	in	support	of	the	tourist	industry	when	long-term	sustainable	solutions	might	be	
more	suitable	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	In	line	with	this,	one	interview	respondent	highlights	that	the	mass	media	may	
give	different	coverage	or	perspectives	on	climate	change	and	disasters,	or	sensationalise	issues	“there	are	some	
mass	media	which	really	bring	attention,	but	there	are	other	media	who	don’t	care	too	much.	Well,	 I	 think	that	
usually,	 particularly	 the	most	 progressive	 ones,	 they	 of	 course	 talk	 about	 climate	 change,	 probably,	 they	 don’t	
completely	understand	what	is	climate	change	and	sometimes	they	are	very	sensationally	or	catastrophic,	but	this	
is	an	important	part	of	the	game	and	this	is	of	course	a	problem	for	the	whole	at	an	international	level,	not	just	a	
national	level”.			 	
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5 Challenge	three:	Strengthening	transboundary	crisis	
management	in	the	EU		
Natural	disasters	have	no	respect	for	national	borders,	with	such	events	frequently	having	cross-boundary	impacts.	
Recent	European	transboundary	disasters	 include	the	2013	Central	Europe	flood,	that	affected	Eastern	Germany	
and	Hungary,	the	extreme	drought	and	heatwave	that	hit	several	countries	in	Europe	in	2003	and	the	earthquake	
that	hit	the	borders	between	Italy	and	France	in	1995.	Collaboration	between	nation	states	and	relevant	actors	is	
essential	in	managing	such	events	(Parolai	et	al.,	2016).		
Presently,	within	the	EU	the	Civil	Protection	Mechanism	(CPM)	aims	to	provide	‘coordinated,	effective	and	efficient	
response	to	disasters’.	The	CMP	brings	together	the	response	capacity	of	 the	EU’s	28	member	states	to	provide	
coordinated	assistance	during	an	emergency.	Countries	worldwide	 can	 call	 upon	 the	CPM	during	an	emergency	
should	their	national	response	capacity	become	overwhelmed.	The	EU	CPM	is	operationalised	by	the	Emergency	
Response	Coordination	Centre	(ERCC)	which	monitors	emergencies	and	provides	a	platform	to	coordinate	responses	
(ECHO,	2017).	In	November	2017,	the	European	Commission	proposed	a	new	mechanism	in	response	to	a	growing	
number	of	extreme	events	affecting	multiple	countries	at	once	that	have	stretched	the	limits	of	the	EU	CPM.	The	
newly	proposed	‘rescEU’	will	include	a	response	reserve	of	civil	protection	assets,	in	addition	to	national	capacities	
(European	Commission,	2017c).		
The	chapter	concerns	the	question	of	how	to	enhance	and	strengthen	transboundary	crisis	management	in	the	EU.	
The	 challenge	 is	 rather	 concerned	 with	 how	 to	 improve	 regulatory	 framework,	 management	 structures	 and	
communication	between	EU	countries	for	disasters	and	emergencies	within	the	EU	borders.	This	challenge	involves	
multiple	different	and	complex	issues	that	are	hard	to	address	as	they	have	to	do	with	national	sovereignty,	and	the	
relationships	between	EU	and	national	policies.	The	question	of	governance	is	highly	central	to	this	and	the	large	
and	increasing	number	of	public	and	private	actors	is	one	of	the	major	complexities	in	disaster	response	and	risk	
management	(Granot,	1997;	Kory,	1998;	Katoch,	2006).	Although	the	problem	is	broader	than	this	and	also	concerns	
the	fundamental	issue	of	changing	perceptions	among	national	governments	and	emergency	agencies	to	go	beyond	
seeing	crisis	management	solely	from	a	national	point	of	view.	But	this	is	a	complex	issue,	evolving	as	a	result	of	
simultaneous	 processes	 of	 centralization	 and	 decentralization.	 As	 Bossong	 and	 Hegemann	 (2015)	 have	 noted,	
“functional	 pressures	 for	 centralization	 and	 trans-nationalization	 exist	 alongside	 deep	 rooted	 and	 potentially	
conflicting	political	interests	and	cultural	traditions,	not	to	forget	cross-cutting	trends	towards	more	decentralized	
societal	resilience.”	In	other	words,	striking	the	balance	between	transnational	and	localised	policy	processes	that	
are	both	trans-national	and	local	in	nature,	are	not	fully	developed	yet	within	the	EU.	Importantly,	this	also	has	to	
do	with	cultural	perceptions	about	international	cooperation,	as	much	as	it	has	to	with	policy	development.	
At	the	global	 level,	the	recent	important	frameworks	all	reiterate	and	highlight	the	importance	of	transboundary	
cooperation.	 The	 SFDRR	 recognizes	 the	 pivotal	 role	 of	 international,	 regional,	 sub-regional	 and	 transboundary	
cooperation	 in	 supporting	 the	efforts	of	 States,	 their	national	 and	 local	 authorities,	 as	well	 as	 communities	 and	
businesses,	to	reduce	disaster	risk.	It	highlights	that	each	State	has	the	primary	responsibility	to	prevent	and	reduce	
disaster	risk,	including	exploiting	international,	regional,	sub-regional,	transboundary	and	bilateral	cooperation.	It	
guides	 actions	 at	 national	 and	 local	 levels,	 as	well	 as	 regional	 and	 international	 levels,	 to	 foster	more	 efficient	
planning,	create	common	information	systems	and	exchange	good	practices	and	programmes	for	cooperation	and	
capacity	 development,	 in	 particular	 to	 address	 common	 and	 transboundary	 disaster	 risks.	 Similarly,	 the	 Paris	
Agreement	 advocates	 global	 and	 regional	 cooperation	 and	 views	 climate	 change	 and	 adaptation	 in	 a	 global	
dimension.	 It	 brings	 all	 nations	 into	 a	 common	 cause	 to	 combat	 climate	 change	 and	 adapt	 to	 its	 effects,	 with	
enhanced	support	to	assist	developing	countries	(UNFCCC,	2016).	Likewise,	within	the	UN	SDGs	there	is	a	dedicated	
goal	on	revitalizing	global	partnerships	for	sustainable	development	which	recognise	the	transboundary	nature	of	
the	problem	and	the	importance	of	transboundary	cooperation.	Accordingly,	this	goal	highlights	the	essential	role	
of	the	partnerships	at	the	global,	regional,	national	and	local	level	(UN,	2015).	
The	two	other	ESPREssO	challenges	(integrating	CCA	and	DRR	and	the	relationship	between	Science	and	Policy)	are	
related	to	this	third	challenge	in	a	number	of	ways,	as	will	be	apparent	in	the	following	descriptions	and	analyses	of	
the	 issues.	While	the	focus	on	transboundary	crisis	management	has	an	 immediate	relevance	for	DRR,	there	are	
certain	areas	in	which	CCA	intersects	with	DRR	to	make	transboundary	issues	more	complex,	such	as	sea	level	rise	
which	has	global	implications.	Similarly,	sharing	knowledge,	streamlining	risk	assessments	and	implementing	similar	
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early	warning	principles	as	described	in	Chapter	4,	has	an	added	complex	dimension	when	dealing	with	these	issues	
in	a	transboundary	context.	
5.1 Isolated	national	thinking	and	lack	of	political	will	
As	a	point	of	departure	for	the	other	issues	at	stake	within	this	challenge,	several	national	reports	have	noted	how	
a	sense	of	isolated	national	thinking,	coupled	with	lack	of	political	will	and	motivation,	is	a	general	hindrance	for	
implementing	better	transboundary	policies,	tools	and	practices.	This	also	relates,	as	noted	for	several	countries,	to	
a	perception	that	the	kinds	of	disasters	and	emergencies	that	occur	in	countries,	unless	directly	situated	on	borders	
between	 countries,	 can	 be	 handled	 without	 assistance	 from	 neighbouring	 countries,	 or	 from	 the	 EU	 support	
mechanisms.	While	most	disasters	and	emergencies	within	 the	EU	are	 indeed	of	a	scale	manageable	 to	modern	
industrialized	 nations,	 such	 thinking	 is	 nonetheless	 dangerous	 in	 light	 of	 future	 climate	 change	 altering	 existing	
patterns	 of	 hazards.	 The	 issue	 at	 stake	 is	 to	 challenge	 the	 perception	 by	 countries	 that	 emergencies	 can	 be	
adequately	dealt	with	without	the	need	for	international	assistance.	
For	instance,	in	the	UK	there	is	a	perception	that	the	country	ought	to	be	self-dependent	during	disaster	response,	
recovery	and	adaptation,	for	both	DRR	and	CCA.	The	UK	does	not	have	strong	communication	links	with	other	nation	
states	internationally,	when	it	comes	to	transboundary	crisis	management.	This	relates	mostly	to	a	lack	of	political	
attention	and	interest	in	transboundary	crisis	management,	owing	to	the	opinion	that,	as	an	island,	transboundary	
issues	are	not	a	concern.	As	a	result,	the	UK	has	no	formal	procedures	to	work	with	neighbouring	states	to	manage	
them.	Ten	out	of	15	experts	interviewed	for	the	UK	national	report	emphasise	that	there	is	no	political	willingness	
to	communicate	with	other	nation	states	on	transboundary	crisis	(Amaratunga	et	al.,	2017a).	
In	Germany,	there	are	no	laws	that	specifically	address	the	issue	of	international	disaster	assistance	at	the	federal	
level,	although	there	are	a	number	of	existing	bilateral	agreements	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	This	specifically	applies	to	
situations	where	Germany	itself	would	be	in	need	of	international	assistance.	This	lack	of	relevant	legislation	can	
primarily	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	so	far	there	has	not	been	a	disaster	affecting	German	territory	as	a	whole	
that	would	 result	 in	 a	need	 for	 international	 assistance.	 It	 is	 predominantly	 the	 role	of	 the	 Länder	 to	deal	with	
transboundary	 issues	 themselves,	 with	 certain	 Länder	 having	 agreements	 with	 neighbouring	 nations,	 such	 as	
between	Bavaria	and	Austria.		
When	it	comes	to	the	question	of	drawing	on	support	from	more	than	bilateral	agreements	(i.e.	the	EU	support	
mechanism)	there	is	a	perception	that	the	support	of	bilateral	agreements	would	be	more	than	sufficient.	In	France,	
for	 instance,	 it	 is	 considered	 unlikely	 that	 a	 disaster	 would	 require	 extra-European	 means	 because	 France	 is	
surrounded	by	countries	that	are	adequately	equipped	to	deal	with	disasters	 likely	to	befall	France.	Accordingly,	
when	 the	 French	 authorities	 decide	 to	 call	 for	 international	 assistance,	 this	will	 generally	 involve	 a	 request	 for	
specific	equipment	from	neighbouring	countries	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	
Efforts	should	be	made	in	the	future	to	make	CCA	and	DRR	integration	among	and	between	member	states	an	EU	
priority.	This	can	only	be	achieved	via	a	strengthening	of	international	communication	and	information	sharing,	as	
well	as	clearer	policies,	guidelines	and	tools	for	making	better	use	of	transboundary	cooperation.	This	perhaps	also	
means	that	there	needs	to	be	found	ways	to	address	the	sensitive	subject	of	respecting	national	sovereignty	while	
doing	effective	transboundary	crisis	management.	This	problem	is	summed	up	succinctly	by	an	Asian	respondent	
from	the	global	data	 (Appendix	01):	“The	main	barrier	 for	more	 integrated	crisis	management	or	 transboundary	
response,	to	these	problems	is	that	the	state	actually	observes	this	norm	of	non-interference.	So,	counties	actually	
kind	of	respect	the	sovereignty	of	another	country.	And	(…)	because	of	that,	they	actually	(…)	try	to	avoid	interfering	
with	a	country	and	they	also	avoid	forcing	a	country,	to	(…)	share,	the	knowledge	that	they	generate.”	
5.2 Absence	of	policies	and	tools	for	transboundary	crisis	management	
As	disasters	proliferate	regionally	and	focus	shifts	from	post-disaster	management	to	DRR,	one	of	the	big	questions	
is	how	to	set	up	the	most	effective	and	useful	international	structures	for	transboundary	crisis	management.	
Although	 there	 are	 a	multitude	 of	 bilateral	 and	multilateral	 signed	 agreements	 between	 EU	member	 states	 for	
dealing	with	risks,	such	as	storms	and	floods	along	the	North	Sea	coast	or	avalanches	and	landslides	in	the	Alpine	
region,	there	 is	a	 lack	of	 legal	 instruments	and	concrete	policies	that	can	be	used	by	national,	regional	and	 local	
governments	to	effectively	use	transboundary	aspects	for	crisis	response.	This	has	also	been	noted	as	a	gap	even	
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when	international	political	agreements	between	countries	(either	bilaterally	or	in	mulita-lateral	agreements)	have	
been	signed	and	agreed	upon.	For	instance,	although	the	Nordic	countries	have	demonstrated	political	willingness	
to	strengthen	the	cooperative	and	operational	capacities	of	disaster	management,	no	operative	outcomes	are	yet	
in	 place.	 In	 the	 Haga	 Declaration	 from	 2009,	 the	 ministers	 of	 defence	 from	 the	 Nordic	 countries	 declared	 a	
willingness	to	develop,	among	other	things,	a	common	Nordic	emergency	response	unit.	However,	at	the	moment	
no	operational	results	have	come	out	of	it	(Lauta	et	al.,	2017,	Nordic	Council,	2010).	
Another	 example	 is	 the	 Rhône	 river	 basin,	 connecting	 Switzerland	 and	 France.	 There	 is	 no	 institutionalised	
transboundary	management	of	the	river,	only	sectoral	agreements	(Bréthaut	and	Pflieger,	2013).	Moreover,	there	
are	only	a	few	(or	no)	actors	with	an	overall	view	of	the	river’s	governance	and	no	regulatory	institution	at	the	river	
basin	scale.	The	management	of	the	Rhône	river	system	is	characterised	by	a	highly-fragmented	governance	system	
consisting	of	complex,	interconnecting	public	and	private	laws.	Bi-lateral	agreements	have	existed	between	different	
stakeholders	 for	many	 years,	 reached	 by	 negotiations	 between	 key	 operators,	 but	 these	 negotiations	were	 not	
necessarily	open	to	all.	 It	therefore	became	difficult	to	build	a	realistic	picture	of	the	“state	of	play”.	Private	 law	
agreements	added	a	complicating	factor	to	transboundary	transparency	and	communication	issues	in	the	region,	
which	needed	resolving	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	Similar	 issues	have	been	 identified	for	 Italy	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017)	 in	
terms	of	volcanic	risks	that	might	have	transboundary	consequences.	For	the	Italian	context,	it	was	noted	that	the	
challenge	concerns	the	question	of	how	to	build-up	common	transboundary	models	and	procedures	to	increase	the	
effectiveness	of	a	coordinated	action	in	the	field	of	the	technical	management	of	emergency,	safety	evaluation	and	
risk	prevention.	
The	French	national	report	notes	that	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	there	is	a	lack	of	common	procedures	and	policies	
for	 transboundary	 crisis	 response	 and	 DRR	 concerns	 the	 procedural	 difference	 among	 nations	 in	 employing	
professionals	in	neighbouring	countries,	a	point	raised	by	the	NGO	sector	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	
The	EU	has	in	recent	years	provided	a	number	of	different	directives	and	policies	aimed	at	strengthening	DRR	and	
CCA	in	member	states,	which	also	includes	transboundary	mechanisms.	According	to	Boin	et	al.	(2014),	the	EU	has	
‘modest	 but	 promising	 capacities’	 in	 assisting	 member	 states	 during	 times	 of	 disaster.	 With	 the	 ‘innumerable	
linkages	between	the	societies	of	the	EU	states	that	have	been	created	by	the	integration	process	in	the	last	sixty	
years’	(Attina,	2013),	legal	and	policy	cohesion	in	terms	of	DRR	is	necessary.	As	Boin	et	al.	(2014)	highlights,	there	
has	been	an	increased	vulnerability	to	transboundary	disasters	within	the	EU,	as	‘many	of	the	systems	that	sustain	
basic	societal	functions	(…)	now	reach	across	European	political	borders’.	EU	efforts	regarding	DRR	has	increased	
vastly	in	the	last	15	years.	Nonetheless,	the	framework	as	a	whole	faces	a	number	of	challenges	in	balancing	the	
very	 different	 needs	 and	 governance	 systems	 of	 member	 states,	 with	 an	 increasing	 need	 for	 a	 coherent	 and	
integrated	DRR	strategy	for	Europe.	Coordination	between	different	member	states	and	also	within	the	EU	to	tackle	
transboundary	issues	is	crucial.	
Flood	 risk	 management	 in	 Central	 Europe	 is	 one	 case	 in	 which	 identifiable	 improvements	 to	 transboundary	
cooperation	has	been	enhanced	by	EU	legislation	as	well	as	agreed-upon	common	practices.	For	the	German	report,	
interviewed	experts	and	reviews	of	the	existing	literature	suggest	that	flood	management	on	transboundary	rivers	
is	a	best	practice	example.	Procedural	and	legal	frameworks	have	substantially	improved	within	the	last	15	years,	
in	particular	in	terms	of	flood	warnings,	where	clear	regulations	and	agreements	are	in	place	in	most	of	the	regions.	
“Large	scale,	transboundary	hydro-meteorological	events	like	the	Elbe/Labe	floods	in	2002	and	2013.	Comparison	
of	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 capabilities	 in	 2013	 vs.	 2002	 demonstrates	 substantial	 progress	 that	 has	 been	 made	 on	
transboundary	 and	 transnational	 exchange	 of	 critical	 information	 and	 resources	 to	 deal	 with	 such	 disastrous	
situations”	(interview	with	DWD).	Here,	the	EFD	and	the	Water	Framework	Directive	(WFD)	have	been	highlighted	
as	policies	 that	have	had	a	positive	 impact.	As	 legal	acts,	mandatory	 for	EU	members,	 the	directives	have	been	
crucial	steps	towards	cooperation	and	joint	objective-setting	across	national	borders	(Marx	et	al.,	2017).	
The	EFD	and	the	WFD	can	be	identified	as	best	practices	in	the	EU	for	effective	transboundary	crisis	management.	
The	EU	flood	directive	aims	is	to	reduce	and	manage	the	risks	that	floods	pose	to	human	health,	the	environment,	
cultural	 heritage	 and	 economic	 activity.	 The	 Directive	 required	Member	 States	 to	 first	 carry	 out	 a	 preliminary	
assessment	in	2011	to	identify	the	river	basins	and	associated	coastal	areas	at	risk	of	flooding.	For	such	zones	they	
then	 needed	 to	 draw	 up	 flood	 risk	 maps	 by	 2013	 and	 to	 establish	 flood	 risk	 management	 plans	 focused	 on	
prevention,	protection	and	preparedness	by	2015.	The	Directive	applies	to	inland	waters	as	well	as	all	coastal	waters	
across	the	whole	territory	of	the	EU	(European	Commission,	2017a).		
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The	WFD	is	‘widely	accepted	as	the	most	substantial	and	ambitious	piece	of	European	environmental	legislation	to	
date’	(Voulvoulis	et	al.,	2017).	The	Directive	introduces	a	new	legislative	approach	to	managing	and	protecting	water,	
based	not	on	national	or	political	boundaries	but	on	natural	geographical	and	hydrological	formations:	river	basins.	
It	also	requires	coordination	of	different	EU	policies,	and	sets	out	a	precise	timetable	for	action,	2015	was	the	target	
date	for	getting	all	European	waters	into	good	condition.	The	aim	is	to	reduce	risk	from	pollution	in	lieu	of	growing	
demand,	with	public	participation	and	river	basin	management	plans	as	key	tools	 for	 implementation	(ibid).	The	
framework	 is	 complemented	 by	 other	 EU	 legislation	 regulating	 specific	 aspects	 of	 water	 use	 such	 as	 the	
Groundwater	Directive	(2006),	the	Environmental	Quality	Standards	Directive	(2008),	two	Commission	Decisions	(in	
2005	and	2008)	on	ecological	status,	establishing	a	 register	of	almost	1,500	sites	 included	 in	an	 inter-calibration	
exercise	to	allow	for	comparison	of	different	countries’	standards,	and	published	their	results	(ibid).	
The	aim	is	to	bring	about	a	‘fundamental	change	to	water	management’	(Wilby	et	al.,	2006)	by	introducing	a	single	
system	of	objectives	through	the	integrated	River	Basin	Management	Plans	(RBMPs)	within	specified	timeframes.	
The	objectives	are	to:	‘(a)	prevent	further	deterioration,	protect	and	enhance	the	status	of	aquatic	ecosystems	and	
the	water	needs	of	terrestrial	and	wetland	ecosystems;	(b)	promote	sustainable	water	use	based	on	the	long-term	
protection	of	available	water	resources;	(c)	enhance	protection	and	improvement	of	the	aquatic	environment;	(d)	
ensure	the	progressive	reduction	of	pollution	of	groundwater;	and	(e)	contribute	to	mitigating	the	effects	of	floods	
and	droughts’	(Wilby	et	al.,	2006).	This	framework	in	turn	contributes	to	the	wider	CCA	and	DRR	policies	in	terms	of	
reducing	flooding	risks,	pollution	and	shifts	in	ecosystems	caused	by	climate	change.	
5.3 Lack	of	standardized	forms	of	communication	
A	recurring	issue	across	most	of	the	national	reports	pertains	to	the	lack	of	standardized	forms	of	communication	
between	official	agencies	of	countries.	Importantly,	this	relates	to	knowledge	sharing	beyond	emergency	and	crisis	
communication.	 In	 other	words,	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 implementation	 across	 borders	 is	 also	 hindered	 by	 standards	 of	
communication	for	exchange	of	knowledge	and	coordination	of	tasks.	
For	Switzerland,	a	respondent	framed	the	problem	accordingly:	“Miscommunication	problems	may	arise	between	
two	different	political	cultures.	It	was	really	striking	and	interesting	to	see	France’s	priority	to	find	an	agreement.	On	
the	Swiss	side,	before	talking	about	the	agreements,	let’s	talk	about	the	issues.	The	pace	was	different.	The	Swiss	
wanted	to	take	their	time	in	considering	their	options”.	
For	France,	the	 language	barrier	has	been	identified	as	key	for	this	 issue,	which	 is	particularly	problematic	when	
working	with	nation	states	for	cross-border	crisis	management.	More	effort	to	raise	awareness	about	methods	used	
in	neighbouring	countries	would	help	to	mitigate	the	language	problem	by	creating	awareness	among	actors	of	other	
nations	methods	ahead	of	any	disastrous	event.	Efficient	cooperation	relies	on	a	good	knowledge	of	foreign	relief	
team	working	techniques,	means	and	methods.	Additionally,	coordination	will	become	easier	when	certain	working	
habits	are	put	in	place.	For	the	Italian	context,	it	was	also	highlighted	that	although	the	transfer	and	exchange	of	
best	practices	and	good	solutions	for	transboundary	crisis	management	exists,	more	is	needed	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	
A	need	highlighted	for	several	countries	was	to	enhance	communication	between	countries.	One	obvious	starting	
point	would	be	to	establish	clear	identifiable	contact	points	for	nations	and	sub-national	government	levels.	Simply	
increasing	communication	and	awareness	between	national	strategies	enhances	transboundary	cooperative	links,	
in	preparation	for	times	when	it	is	perhaps	urgently	required.		
Thus,	it	seems	crucial	to	develop	the	links	during	‘normal’	times	and	test	it	regularly.	Accordingly,	incentive	for	local-
level	 stakeholders	 to	communicate	 regularly	with	 their	 cross-border	 counterpart	 should	be	 in	place.	 In	 terms	of	
transboundary	 knowledge	 transfer,	 the	 research	 platform,	 ‘Intrapraevent’,	 hosted	 in	 Austria,	 fosters	 scientific	
exchange	 between	 Swiss	 scientists	 and	 policy-makers	 at	 a	 global	 level,	 in	 researching	 natural	 hazards	 and	 risk	
reduction	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	Such	initiatives	might	also	be	considered	best	practice	for	establishing	a	recurring	
cross-border	communication.		
5.4 International	cooperation	across	national	government	levels	
A	further	 issue	relates	to	the	vertical	organization	of	DRR	responsibilities	across	government	entities	at	different	
levels	 and	 scales.	 There	 can	 indeed	 be	 spill-over	 effects	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 clear	 policies	 and	 tools	 for	 intra-national	
emergency	management	for	barriers	to	inter-national	cooperation,	when	sub-national	or	sub-federal	government	
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entities	have	to	engage	in	 international	cooperation.	This	 issue	relates	to	points	that	have	been	already	touched	
upon	in	the	chapters	on	the	other	two	challenges.	
For	Germany,	it	was	noted	that	the	vertical	cooperation	within	DRR	is	complicated	by	the	distinction	between	civil	
protection	(“Zivilschutz”)	with	administrative	responsibility	at	the	federal	level,	and	civil	protection	with	respect	to	
all	other	kinds	of	hazards	and	threats	(“Katastrophenschutz”)	that	falls	under	the	responsibility	of	the	federal	states.	
As	one	academic	scholar	pointed	out,	“in	other	countries	with	a	more	centralised	system,	it	is	often	expected	that	
the	 BBK	 [‘Bundessamt	 für	 Bevölkerungsschutz	 und	 Katastrophenhilfe’	 or	 ‘Federal	Office	 for	 Civil	 Protection	 and	
Disaster	Assistance’]	could	take	the	lead	in	transboundary	situations	that	involve	several	federal	states	which	is	not	
the	case.”	The	ways	that	this	issue	is	expressed	thus	depend	very	much	on	the	governmental	system	of	a	country,	
whether	 it	 is	 a	 federation	 or	 one	 nation-state.	 In	 the	 German	 case,	 it	 has	 thus	 been	 suggested	 to	 restructure	
legislative	and	administrative	levels	and	structures	that	blur	the	boundaries	of	responsibility	between	government	
levels,	which	 could	 involve	 an	 abolishment	of	 the	 separation	of	 “Zivilschutz”	 and	 “Katastrophenschutz”	 and	 the	
affiliated	administrative	separation	(BBK	and	DST,	2010).	
The	German	case	indicates	that	the	present	EU	framework	is	not	well	suited	to	differences	between	Federal	and	
national	state	actors.	This	might	also	open	up	for	a	discussion	about	the	discrepancy	between	larger	and	smaller	
countries	in	the	EU	with	respect	to	their	views	and	histories	of	activating	the	civil	protection	mechanism,	implying	
that	larger	countries	might	have	less	interest	in	cross-border	issues	in	general.	
For	Switzerland,	 transboundary	 issues	may,	of	 course,	not	always	be	across	 international	boundaries,	but	 inter-
cantonal	issues,	differences	in	decision-making,	which	can	potentially	lead	to	a	jigsaw	approach	to	either	CCA	or	
DRR.	This	would	 ideally	also	pertain	 to	 the	question	of	 cooperation	with	neighbouring	countries	 for	emergency	
response,	and	also	for	more	long	term	DRR	and	CCA	aspects	that	require	international	negotiations.	
5.5 Lack	of	attention	to	CCA	as	a	cross-border	issue	
In	addition	to	having	different	approaches	to	response	and	risk	assessments	between	the	member	countries,	there	
are	also	different	approaches	for	CCA	between	countries.	Variations	in	the	way	countries	interpret	and	put	policies	
into	action	adds	an	additional	level	of	complexity.	This	is	further	exacerbated	if	a	country	has	many	neighbours.	For	
instance,	Switzerland	shares	its	borders	with	five	other	European	countries:	France,	Italy,	Liechtenstein,	Germany	
and	Austria,	all	of	which	approach	CCA	and	DRR	in	slightly	different	ways	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	
For	 the	 Italian	 context,	 it	 was	 highlighted	 that	 The	 National	 Climate	 Change	 Adaptation	 Plan	 does	 not	 tackle	
transboundary	aspects	of	climate	change	impacts,	which	needs	to	be	a	focus	(Zuccaro	et	al.,	2017).	It	was	suggested	
that	the	integration	of	DRR	and	CCA	could	be	more	sustained	at	EU	level	to	be	effectively	transferred	to	the	Italian	
context.	The	possibility	that	CCA	could	be	directly	dealt	with	by	an	agency	of	the	European	Commission	in	charge	of	
transferring	 results,	estimations,	predictions	 to	 the	structure	of	 the	member	 states	dealing	with	DRR,	 should	be	
considered.	
The	EU	has	indeed	provided	several	strategic	trajectories	in	recent	years	pertaining	to	CCA.	The	2009	White	Paper	
‘Adapting	to	climate	change:	Towards	a	European	framework	for	action’,	sets	out	several	measures	on	adaptation	
(European	Commission,	2009).	Presently,	15	EU	Member	States	have	adopted	an	adaptation	strategy,	with	others	
under	preparation.	Some	of	the	adopted	strategies	have	been	followed	up	by	action	plans	and	there	has	been	some	
progress	in	integrating	adaptation	measures	into	sectoral	policies.	However,	as	adaptation	is	in	most	cases	still	at	an	
early	stage,	with	relatively	few	concrete	measures	on	the	ground,	monitoring	and	evaluation	is	proving	to	be	difficult,	
particularly	as	indicators	and	monitoring	methodologies	have	hardly	been	developed	(ibid).	
Alongside	this,	the	‘Integrated	Approach’	opinion	report	from	February	2017	by	the	European	Commission	(Hertell,	
2017),	highlighted	the	Commission’s	need	to	embed	their	actions	further	into	global	frameworks	and	‘reinforce	its	
exemplary	role	as	well	as	to	help	build	the	synergies	between	them’	(ibid:	10).	The	report	later	highlighted	how	the	
official	Climate	Adaptation	Strategy	review	to	be	published	in	2018,	shall	better	‘reflect	on	the	transboundary	aspect	
of	 the	 climate	 risk	management	 issue’	 (ibid:	 11)	 emphasizing	 the	 significance	of	 the	Paris	Agreement	 to	 the	 EU	
strategy.	
The	need	for	more	focus	on	the	DRR	aspects	of	CCA	as	transboundary	issues	is	an	area	in	which	the	EU	should	look	
to	 strengthen	 its	 focus	 and	 support	 for	 member	 states,	 also	 for	 bilateral	 cooperation	 between	 neighbouring	
countries	in	addition	to	the	work	being	done	at	the	general	EU	level.	
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5.6 Conflicting	priorities	in	environmental	resources	and	DRR,		
A	related	issue	to	that	identified	in	Section	5.5	is	that	transboundary	cooperation	is	also	relevant	within	the	context	
of	environmental	 resource	protection,	and	specifically	how	such	concerns	 intersect	with	concerns	over	DRR	and	
CCA.	This	issue	pertains	both	to	the	need	for	bilateral	or	multi-lateral	cooperation	between	individual	countries,	as	
well	as	with	the	role	of	EU	policies	in	individual	countries.	For	instance,	in	Switzerland	transboundary	communication	
regarding	management	of	the	large	Swiss-border	alpine	lakes,	namely	Ticino	(shared	with	Italy)	and	Lake	of	Geneva	
(shared	with	 France)	 is	 a	 complex	 arena	where	environmental	 and	economic	pressures	 compete,	 e.g.	 flood	 risk	
management,	crises	management,	use,	amenity,	and	risk	mitigation	are	all	issues	which	span	shared	borders	(Booth	
et	al.,	2017).	However,	divergent	interests	sometimes	emerge	in	terms	of	governance	issues.	One	example	regards	
managing	lake	levels	for	different	purposes,	e.g.	nuclear	power	plants	in	France	on	the	Rhone	prioritise	a	certain	
flow	rate	and	lake	storage	capacity	that	is	sometimes	at	odds	with	flood	defence	mitigation	measures.	
A	related	issue	concerns	the	obstacles	associated	with	EU	regulations	and	policies	over	environmental	protection	
and	conservation,	specifically	the	use	of	EU	habitat	zones.	In	Denmark	EU	habitat	zones	have	in	a	few	cases	been	
identified	as	 interfering	with	 the	ability	of	Danish	municipalities	 (Copenhagen	and	Vejle)	 to	 implement	effective	
flood	protection	measures,	both	 for	water	streams	and	coasts.	As	special	 regulations	govern	the	ability	 for	 local	
authorities	to	make	changes	to	water	flows	in	EU	habitat	zones,	the	priority	of	nature	conservation	strains	the	ability	
for	making	DRR	and	CCA	related	actions,	although	local	officials	see	no	inherent	conflict	in	balancing	these	different	
concerns.	
For	France,	 it	was	noted	how	the	 integration	of	 the	watershed	management	approach	and	 the	consideration	of	
natural	hazards	and	risk	management	strategies	in	all	planning	processes	relating	to	land-use	and	the	use	of	natural	
resources	is	vital	(Ettinger	et	al.,	2017).	Implementation	of	hazard	zone	maps	in	land-use	planning	and	management	
is	a	first	step	in	this.	This	also	implies	a	need	for	more	arenas	or	platforms	that	allow	for	stakeholder	interaction	and	
knowledge	sharing	(see	also	section	3.6).	
For	 Switzerland	and	France,	 the	GouvRhône	platform	performed	a	 successful	 stakeholder	 analysis	 assessing	 the	
Rhône’s	diverging	interests,	while	serving	as	a	platform	or	“new	arena”	for	Stakeholder	communication	between	
Swiss	and	French	authorities	(Booth	et	al.,	2017).	The	GouvRhône	provided	policy	makers	with	options	and	practical	
advice	on	implementation	opinions	within	the	different	legal	frameworks.	Although	the	project	has	now	concluded,	
it	had	tangible	success	in	generating	an	arena	for	exchanges	between	stakeholders,	which	can	be	expanded	upon.	
This	example	shows	how	environmental	resource	and	land-use	considerations	can	be	addressed	in	relation	to	DRR	
and	CCA	issues	through	stakeholder	engagement.	
At	the	EU	 level,	 it	should	be	noted	that	the	area	of	environmental	protection	 in	relation	to	water	has	been	well	
received.	 The	WFD	 is	 ‘widely	 accepted	as	 the	most	 substantial	 and	ambitious	piece	of	 European	environmental	
legislation	to	date’	(Voulvoulis	et	al.,	2017).	The	Directive	introduces	a	new	legislative	approach	to	managing	and	
protecting	 water,	 based	 not	 on	 national	 or	 political	 boundaries,	 but	 on	 natural	 geographical	 and	 hydrological	
formations:	river	basins.	It	also	requires	the	coordination	of	different	EU	policies,	and	sets	out	a	precise	timetable	
for	action.	The	aim	is	to	reduce	risk	from	pollution	in	lieu	of	growing	demand,	with	public	participation	and	river	
basin	management	plans	as	key	tools	for	implementation	(ibid).	
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6 Concluding	perspectives	
The	aim	of	this	report	was	to	identify	various	issues	relating	to	the	three	ESPREssO	challenges;	the	integration	of	
CCA	and	DRR,	bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	policy	and	the	management	of	transboundary	crises.		
A	number	of	issues	have	been	identified	as	obstacles	to	the	integration	of	DRR	and	CCA.	These	range	from	lack	of	
political	 will	 to	 funding	 issues.	 Further,	 due	 to	 insufficient	 platforms	 for	 communication	 between	 various	
stakeholders	integration	rarely	becomes	a	reality.	However,	positive	stories	from	across	the	EU	and	the	world	can	
be	seen.		
Findings	 from	different	 nations	 across	 the	 EU	 and	 globally	 show	 that	 there	 is	 an	 imbalance	 in	 priorities,	where	
climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	receive	greater	attention	than	DRR.	While	the	aim	of	the	report	is	not	to	present	
a	theoretical	argument	about	whether	CCA	is	a	subset	of	DRR	or	not,	it	must	certainly	be	noted	that	issues	of	DRR	
need	higher	priority	given	the	impacts	and	losses	the	EU	has	been	facing	from	various	disasters.	Furthermore,	it	is	
not	 only	 an	 issue	 of	 prioritisation	 between	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 but	 also	 between	 investments	 in	 short	 term	 disaster	
response	and	 long	terms	risk	reduction.	These	 issues	need	to	be	addressed	 in	policy	 level	dialogue,	as	well	as	 in	
framing	 operational	 guidelines	 on	 how	 best	 to	 bring	 together	 CCA	 and	 DRR.	 Both	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 have	 become	
important	issues	in	policy	debates.	The	year	2015	was	pivotal	for	international	arrangements	in	this	field.	The	SFDRR	
and	 the	 climate	 change	 negotiations	 in	 Paris	 have	 been	 in	 the	 spotlight.	 However,	 there	 are	 still	 no	 concrete	
evidences	of	integration	and	how	to	go	about	it	in	practice.		
Disaster	management	 and	 risk	 reduction	 are	 domains	 enmeshed	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 thus	 are	 also	 affected	 by	
changes	 in	 funding,	 institutional	 reforms	 and	 bureaucratic	 obstacles,	 not	 to	 mention	 a	 reliance	 on	 specialized	
knowledge.	Accordingly,	 technical	knowledge	as	well	as	 science-based	 inputs	are	becoming	pivotal	 to	 successful	
disaster	management.	However,	a	number	of	issues	hinder	the	effective	integration	between	scientific	knowledge	
and	policy	making.	Without	 repeating	 the	 issues	 identified	above,	 it	 seems	 to	be	an	area	 in	which	even	a	 small	
investment	 in	 further	 coordination	 and	 development	 of	 a	 common	 culture	 could	 bring	 visible	 benefits.	 Media	
landscapes	have	been	changing	drastically	over	the	years.	There	is	growing	recognition	for	the	need	to	use	social	
media	but	also	to	investigate	ways	of	how	social	media	can	be	used	better	for	the	right	communication.	It	is	for	both	
policy	and	scientific	domains	to	work	together	to	better	understand	these	challenges.	Accordingly,	scientists	should	
find	new	ways	to	communicate	their	 results	 to	non-specialist	audiences,	by	using,	 for	example,	quantitative	and	
formal	 techniques	 developed	 in	 operational	 research	 (e.g.	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 evaluate	 possible	
mitigation	actions).	On	the	other	side,	decision-makers	should	improve	their	capability	in	order	to	quickly	interpret	
scientific	information	and	translate	this	into	operational	decisions	and	actions.		
Finally,	 the	report	 identified	a	number	of	 issues	 for	 transboundary	crisis	management.	More	and	more	disasters	
affect	 nations	 beyond	 their	 national	 boundaries.	 Here,	 the	 issue	 of	 thinking	 beyond	 national	 boundaries	 takes	
prominence	along	with	the	need	for	political	will.	This	calls	for	political	champions	to	tackle	transboundary	issues	by	
working	towards	new	tools	and	policies.	Further,	as	CCA	and	DRR	battle	to	find	their	space	within	a	broad	range	of	
priorities,	CCA	has	not	gathered	centre	stage	as	a	transboundary	issue.	As	expected,	communication	continues	to	
be	a	major	challenge	across	borders,	not	least	due	to	language	issues.	Transboundary	issues	clearly	show	the	need	
for	not	only	bi-lateral	but	also	multi-lateral	policies	and	discussions	within	the	EU.		
The	identified	issues	with	regard	to	the	three	challenges	will	be	explored	further	via	activities	and	products	of	the	
ESPREssO	project.	The	next	set	of	outputs	from	the	ESPREssO	project	will	present	recommendations	and	solutions	
to	the	identified	challenges.		
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9 Appendix	1:	Findings	from	primary	data	analysis	
Primary	data	gathered	via	interviews	with	CCA	and	DRR	experts	have	been	used	to	supplement	findings	from	the	six	
European	national	reports,	as	discussed	in	Section	2	(‘Methodology’)	of	the	main	report.	In	total,	27	individuals	were	
interviewed.	Thirteen	individuals	provided	responses	via	telephone	and	six	face-to-face	interviews	were	conducted.	
Seven	individuals	formed	three	focus	groups	(two	focus	groups	of	two	and	one	group	of	three).	 In	addition,	one	
respondent	provided	typed	responses	via	email.	Recordings	were	transcribed	and	thematic	analysis	was	conducted	
using	NVivo	software	(QSR	International	Ltd.,	2017).	For	the	thematic	analysis,	initially	three	primary	nodes	were	
defined	 (the	 three	ESPREssO	challenges)	 and	 region	 sub-nodes	 (Africa,	Americas,	Asia,	Australasia,	Global)	were	
placed	under	each	primary	node	so	that	themes	within	each	region	could	be	deduced,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.	
Each	interview	transcript	was	then	analysed	using	open-coding,	this	allowed	key	themes	to	be	elicited	without	any	
pre-assumptions,	to	ensure	new	information	was	not	excluded.	If	a	quotation	referred	to	a	particular	country,	this	
was	indicated	in	the	code.	If	an	extract	clearly	referred	to	either	a	challenge	or	recommendation	or	an	example	of	
best	 practice,	 this	 was	 also	 indicated	 (coded	 ‘challenge’,	 ‘recommends’	 and	 ‘lessons	 learned’	 respectively).	 As	
themes	emerged,	new	sub-nodes	were	defined	and	the	open	coded	material	grouped	together,	as	shown	in	Errore.	
L'origine	riferimento	non	è	stata	trovata..		
Mind-maps	were	 used	 to	 identify	 key	 challenges	 that	 cut	 across	 different	 countries	 and	 regions,	 indicating	 the	
dominant	global	issues.	This	methodology	was	employed	for	each	of	the	three	ESPREssO	challenges.	Summaries	of	
the	findings	are	presented	for	each	challenge	in	the	following	sections.		
Figure	1	Primary	'Challenge'	nodes	and	regional	sub-nodes	were	pre-defined.	
Figure	2	Coding	example.	Quotations	were	coded	under	the	relevant	ESPREssO	challenge	and	region	(in	this	example,	
Challenge	1:	Asia).	A	clear	theme	‘focus	on	disaster	response’	emerged	among	several	Asian	countries	and	these	
extracts	were	grouped	together	under	a	common	node	(‘Challenge	–	focus	on	disaster	response’).		
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Challenge	1:	Integration	of	DRR	and	CCA	
Figure	3	summarises	 the	 findings	pertaining	 to	ESPREssO	Challenge	1	 (integration	of	CCA	and	DRR).	Governance	
structures,	funding,	implementation	and	awareness	were	key	themes	identified	during	the	analysis.	These	themes	
were	found	to	be	present	in	multiple	countries	around	the	globe.		
Figure	3	Summary	of	findings	Challenge	1:	CCA	and	DRR	Integration.	
	
Interview	respondents	frequently	highlighted	the	governance	of	CCA	and	DRR	by	separate	government	departments	
to	be	a	barrier	to	integration.		
One	respondent,	an	expert	in	sustainable	development	in	Africa,	discussed	that	in	many	African	nations	CCA	and	
DRR	are	governed	separately.	In	almost	all	African	countries	DRR	is	housed	in	the	Office	of	the	President	or	Prime	
Minister,	as	a	result	of	DRR	encompassing	terrorism	and	national	security.	CCA	on	the	other	hand	is	often	located	in	
the	Ministry	of	Environment.	The	respondent	noted	that	the	Office	of	the	President	is	not	a	technical	place	to	locate	
DRR	and	makes	it	difficult	for	the	ministries	to	relate	[Global	Interview	#1].		
Some	Asian	nations	also	house	CCA	and	DRR	in	separate	government	departments.	For	example,	in	the	Maldives,	
DRR	is	managed	by	the	National	Disaster	Management	Centre	while	CCA	falls	under	the	Ministry	of	Environment	
and	Energy.	The	two	agencies	do	not	work	together,	resulting	in	policies	that	overlap,	as	one	respondent	from	the	
Maldives	noted:		
“The	agencies	don’t	work	together	also.	They	have	so	many	policies	and	laws	that	overlap	each	other	as	
well.	The	fragmentation	is	the	main	challenge.”	[Global	Interview	#9].		
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Recommendations	 for	 ways	 ahead	 were	 also	 provided.	 One	 African	 respondent	 suggested	 that	 to	 bring	 about	
integration,	institutional	arrangements	need	to	be	overhauled	and	a	multi-sectoral	approach	is	required:	
“I	think	that	like	I	mentioned	before	that	there	needs	to	be	an	institutional	overhaul.	There	needs	to	be	a	
cross-sectoral	approach	or	to	look	at	disaster	risk	reduction	and	to	look	at	climate	change	issues	as	a	cross-
category	issue	that	needs	a	multi-sectoral	approach.”	[Global	Interview	#1].		
For	the	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR,	one	respondent	highlighted	The	Netherlands	Delta	Programme	as	an	example	
of	best	practice.	The	programme	looks	to	reduce	vulnerability	and	increase	resilience	of	flood	prone	urban	areas	in	
the	 Netherlands	 [Global	 Interview	 #2].	 Further	 information	 on	 the	 Programme	 is	 available	 online	 at	
https://www.government.nl/topics/delta-programme.					
Analysis	revealed	funding	to	be	a	key	theme.	Within	funding	there	are	two	apparent	sub-themes,	the	first	being	a	
lack	of	funding	availability,	the	second	being	the	way	in	which	funding	is	allocated.		
An	 example	 from	 Australia	 shows	 how	 limited	 government	 funding	 is	 impacting	 on	 CCA-DRR	 integration.	 The	
respondent	discussed	how	 the	Australian	Government	 is	 implementing	budget	 cuts	across	all	policy	areas.	 Such	
budget	cuts	have	resulted	in	reduced	funding	for	CCA	and	DRR	activities,	but	has	also	reduced	funding	for	public	
health,	 education	 and	 transport,	which	 has	 acted	 in	 increasing	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 population.	Groups	with	
existing	vulnerabilities,	such	as	aboriginal	communities,	are	most	affected	[Global	Interview	#5].		
In	other	 regions	globally,	a	 lack	of	 funding	may	not	necessarily	be	 the	problem,	but	 the	way	 in	which	 funds	are	
appropriated	that	creates	a	barrier	to	integration,	as	suggested	by	one	expert	working	in	Disaster	Risk	Management	
in	 the	United	 States.	 The	 respondent	 noted,	 along	with	 several	 others,	 that	 there	 is	 significantly	more	 funding	
available	for	CCA	than	for	DRR.	Thus,	funding	exists	but	is	not	evenly	distributed.	The	respondent	suggested	that	the	
way	in	which	CCA	and	DRR	are	spoken	of	separately	has	led	to	donors	perceiving	them	as	separate	entities	and	has	
produced	“two	separate	buckets	of	money”.	The	respondent	suggested	that	changing	the	way	we	speak	of	CCA	and	
DRR	could	provide	a	way	forward:	
“I	was	 just	wondering	 if	 those	with	budgets	weren’t	seeing	these	as	 two	separate	things	and	as	more	a	
resilience	piece…and	that’s	more	the	top	word	or	vocab	that	has	been	 integrated	 into	development	and	
international	development	and	from	where	I	sit,	and	that’s	really	all-encompassing.	So	I	wonder	if	perhaps	
that	 is	a	way	of	solving	 it.	Breaking	away	somehow	from	talking	about	 that	so	there	 isn’t	 two	separate	
buckets	of	money,	but	rather	one	that	 is	more	comprehensive	and	brings	together	all	 the	expertise	that	
would	be	needed.”	[Global	Interview	#14].		
This	notion	was	corroborated	by	another	respondent,	who	indicated	that	the	labelling	of	funds	as	CCA	or	DRR	leads	
to	projects	being	viewed	as	one	or	the	other:	
“…when	you	look	at	the	funding	streams,	where	money	is	coming	from,	how	is	it	being	dispersed,	what	tag	
is	it	going	under,	yes?	So	you	have	projects	that	are	going	under	climate	change	adaptation	and	you	have	
projects	 that	are	going	under	DRR.	So	 the	way	 in	which	 these	 funding	 streams	have	been	 tagged	when	
they’re	being	dispersed	also	affects	whether	I	would	look	at	it	as	DRR	or	as	a	CCA	project.”	[Global	Interview	
#3].		
Respondents	from	several	different	countries	including	Australia,	the	Maldives	and	the	Philippines	stated	that	DRR	
and	CCA	policies	often	exist	on	paper	but	that	they	are	not	readily	translated	into	practice.	For	example,	a	focus	
group	with	two	academics	from	the	Maldives	indicated	that	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Energy,	which	deals	
with	CCA,	has	a	strong	climate	change	department,	however	their	policies	are	not	readily	translated	into	actions	
[Global	Interview	#9].	In	the	Philippines,	respondents	suggested	there	was	recognition	by	the	government	of	the	
need	for	integration,	although	the	problem	they	are	grappling	with	is	how	to	operationalise	this	[Global	Interview	
#12].		
A	 respondent	with	 expertise	 in	Australia	 linked	minimal	 policy	 implementation	on	 the	 ground	 to	 a	 lack	of	 local	
government	capacity.	In	Australia,	local	governments	are	responsible	for	the	implementing	CCA	and	DRR	actions,	
however	they	do	not	have	the	required	resources	to	do	so	and	are	not	engaged	in	decision	making	processes	at	
higher	levels	of	government.	In	Africa,	implementation	shortfall	was	linked	to	a	lack	of	skilled	expertise,	where	a	lack	
of	human	resources	and	skilled	expertise	in	government	has	resulted	in	a	lack	of	capacity	to	implement	CCA	and	DRR	
actions	[Global	Interview	#1].		
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Several	respondents	mentioned	a	 lack	of	awareness	of	the	need	to	 integrate	CCA	and	DRR	as	another	barrier	to	
integration.	As	one	respondent	put	it:	
	
“Being	aware	of	the	problem	is	obviously	the	first	step.”	[Typed	Response	#1].		
Awareness	amongst	stakeholders	of	the	difference	between	the	two	concepts	was	indicated	by	respondents	from	
the	 Philippines,	 which	 creates	 difficulties	 in	 bringing	 them	 together	 [Global	 Interview	 #12].	 In	 addition,	 one	
respondent	from	Australia	stated	it	is	difficult	to	define	what	is	clearly	CCA	and	what	is	clearly	DRR	[Global	Interview	
#5].		
A	lack	of	awareness	was	also	found	regarding	the	international	frameworks,	the	Sendai	Framework	for	Disaster	Risk	
Reduction	(SFDRR)	and	the	Paris	Agreement.	Respondents	commonly	placed	themselves	within	either	the	CCA	or	
DRR	domain.	Often,	those	working	in	CCA	found	it	difficult	to	comment	on	the	SFDRR	as	they	felt	they	did	not	have	
sufficient	knowledge,	and	vice	versa,	with	those	working	in	DRR	unable	to	comment	on	the	Paris	Agreement.	For	
example,	one	respondent	working	in	CCA	stated:	
“I	mean,	 I	 know	 very	 little	 about	 the	 Sendai	 Framework	 and	 how	 it’s	 been	 implemented	 so	 I	 wouldn’t	
comment	on	that.”	[Global	Interview	#3].		
While	one	respondent	working	in	DRM	was	unable	to	comment	on	the	Paris	Agreement:	
“Don’t	 know,	 I	 wouldn’t	 be	 able	 to	 speak	 of	 the	 Paris	 agreement,	 I’m	 not	 involved	 in	 that	 sphere	 and	
policies.”	[Global	Interview	#14].		
Another	respondent	also	indicated	that	the	Paris	Climate	Change	Agreement	is	more	dominant	in	political	thinking	
than	the	SFDRR	globally,	and	that	only	those	working	in	DRR	are	fully	aware	of	The	Framework	[Global	Interview	#4].	
Another	respondent	added	to	this,	stating	that	there	is	not	a	good	level	of	consciousness	of	the	SFDRR	at	city	level,	
where	actions	are	taken	[Global	Interview	#14].	However,	no	respondent	provided	a	clear	indication	of	how	to	raise	
awareness	of	international	frameworks	amongst	actors.				
	
Challenge	2:	Science	and	Policy	
Figure	 4	 presents	 the	 key	 findings	 relating	 to	 ESPREssO	Challenge	 2:	 Science	 and	 Policy.	 Key	 themes	 related	 to	
political	 issues,	 science	 issues,	public	awareness	and	 limited	access	 to	 relevant	data.	Communication	was	also	a	
dominant	theme,	with	the	influence	of	the	media	on	public	opinions	being	perceived	as	a	global	issue.		
Specific	issues	relating	to	the	policy	making	process	were	highlighted	by	respondents.	For	example,	one	respondent	
from	the	Philippines	indicated	that	decision	makers	are	not	bound	to	follow	scientific	evidence	and	that	in	some	
cases,	 science	 is	 only	 consulted	 as	 a	 token	 gesture	 [Global	 Interview	 #12].	 Decision	 makers	 also	 have	 other	
considerations	 to	 make	 such	 as	 the	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 impacts	 of	 their	 decisions,	 which	 may	 take	
precedence.	 There	 are	 also	 issues	 pertaining	 specifically	 to	 science.	 One	 respondent	 highlighted	 that	 scientists	
around	the	globe	tend	to	be	poor	communicators	[Global	Interview	#3].	The	use	of	complex	technical	language	can	
also	prevent	 scientific	 information	being	 taken	up	by	practitioners.	This	 is	particularly	evident	 in	climate	change	
information	which	is	regarded	to	be	difficult	to	apply	practically	in	its	current	format.	One	respondent	suggested	
that	 scientific	 information	needs	 to	be	put	 in	 context	 for	decision	makers	 to	add	meaning	and	 to	make	 it	more	
relevant	for	the	user	[Global	Interview	#3].		
Communication	issues	were	frequently	highlighted,	not	only	between	scientists	and	policy	makers	but	also	in	terms	
of	communicating	climate	change	and	disasters	to	the	public.	The	media	play	a	significant	role	in	communicating	
information	to	the	public	in	many	countries.		However,	the	media	only	report	on	issues	for	short	periods	(for	example	
after	a	disaster)	and	have	a	tendency	to	sensationalise	disasters	leading	to	public	misconceptions.	For	example,	one	
respondent	noted:	
“I	see	some	barriers,	such	as	the	(very)	short-term	approach	to	problems	or	an	excessive	sensationalism,	i.e.	
focus	on	catastrophe	and	drama	(to	forget	that	very	same	drama	the	next	day…).”	[Typed	response	#1].		
This	may	be	compounded	by	the	fact	that	the	public	find	climate	change	information	difficult	to	understand.		
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Two	respondents	indicated	the	use	of	influencers,	such	as	well-known	figures	or	celebrities	may	be	useful	in	raising	
awareness	of	climate	change	and	natural	hazards.			
Figure	4:	Key	findings	Challenge	2:	Bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	policy.	
	
Challenge	3:	Transboundary	Crisis	Management	
Key	 findings	 regarding	 the	management	 of	 transboundary	 crises	 are	 presented	 in	 Figure	 5.	 Key	 themes	 include	
fragmentation	of	existing	transboundary	agreements,	the	predominance	of	emergency	aid	agreements,	funding	and	
the	isolation	of	some	nations.			
Respondents	from	island	nations	were	generally	dismissive	of	trans-boundary	issues	and	suggested	that	they	did	not	
apply	 to	 them,	 as	 they	were	 an	 island.	 Examples	 include	 the	 Philippines,	 Sri	 Lanka	 and	 the	UK.	 In	 other	 cases,	
continuing	 historical	 tensions	 between	 countries	 prevent	 cooperation.	One	 respondent	 noted	 little	 cooperation	
between	South	East	Asian	countries	due	to	the	legacy	of	the	Indochina	wars	[Global	Interview	2].	A	culture	of	respect	
for	 other	 nations	 sovereignty	 was	 also	 highlighted,	 leading	 to	 bordering	 nations	 remaining	 isolated	 from	 one	
another.	As	one	respondent	from	the	Philippines	stated:		
“People	mind	their	own	problems.	they	don’t	share	them.”	[Global	Interview	#12].		
Transboundary	agreements	 in	existence	tend	to	be	bilateral	agreements	for	post-disaster	emergency	aid,	as	one	
respondent	from	the	Philippines	noted.	Existing	transboundary	disaster	agreements	tend	to	operate	 in	 isolation,	
with	little	regard	for	other	agreements	and	there	is	no	central	governance	to	manage	multiple	agreements	[Global	
Interview	#13].	
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One	respondent	provided	an	example	of	best	practice	 in	Africa.	The	respondent	noted	that	due	 to	 the	arbitrary	
nature	of	boarders	in	Africa,	transboundary	movements	of	people	and	activities	are	much	more	common,	therefore	
there	is	a	greater	awareness	of	transboundary	issues	[Global	Interview	#4].	Countries	in	east	Africa	have	taken	a	
regional	approach	to	drought	management	with	a	regional	partnership,	the	Global	Water	Partnership	East	Africa	
(GWP	 East	 Africa)	 which	 aims	 to	 manage	 water	 resources	 and	 to	 tackle	 climate	 change	 in	 the	 region.	 More	
information	on	the	partnership	can	be	found	online	at	http://www.gwp.org/en/GWP-Eastern-Africa/.		
	
	
Figure	5	Summary	of	key	findings	for	ESPREssO	Challenge	3:	Management	of	Transboundary	Crises.	
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